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NORMALIZED TAXES IN UTILITY RATES:
GIVING CREDITS WHEN NONE ARE DUE
SAMUEL H. LIBERMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Privately owned utility companies in recent years have spent
an increasing share of the nation's new capital investment.' Elec-
tric power companies have raised large amounts of capital for new
and replacement generating facilities,2 including a number of
costly nuclear facilities.3 The market possibilities for public util-
ity investment under existing regulatory law, however, are appar-
ently not attractive enough to raise all the capital desired by the
electric utility companies.
4
A number of regulatory actions have been suggested and
occasionally adopted to assist these companies in their efforts to
raise capital. These include raising the rates of return on common
* Assistant Professor of Clinical Law, Washington University. A.B., Amherst College,
LL.B. Harvard University. The author wishes to express his appreciation to David New-
burger, Esq., and also to: Dale Swihart, Professor of Law; James A. Anderson, Associate
Professor of Accounting; and, Edward L. Spitznagel, Jr., Associate Professor of Mathe-
matics, all of Washington University. The author is also grateful to his research assistants,
Richard Goldstein and Debbi Klopman.
1. Electric utilities accounted for 15.7% of industries' annual expenditures for new
plant and equipment in 1974 as compared to 7.9% in 1964 and 5.3% in 1947. See U.S. DEP'T
OF COMM., SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS (statistical Supp. 1975). Under President Ford's
energy plan for 1976-85, $750 billion or about 3/4 of the net private domestic investment
for the period, was to be in electrification. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not
Taken?, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 65, 70 (1976).
2. M. WEIDENBAUM, FINANCING THE ELEcRmc UTILITY INDUSTRY, Pub. No. 1, Center for
the Study of American Business 427, 443 (1975).
3. Id. at 429, 433, 463 passim.
4. See Financial Problems of the Electric Utilities: Hearings on National Fuel and
Energy Policy Study Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and InsularAffairs, 93rd Cong.,
2d Sess., 21, 38-40 (1974) (prepared statement of I. Stelzer and H. Roseman) [hereinafter
cited as STUDY HEmrNrGs]. One can argue that the true cause for any difficulty in raising
capital is the lack of proven existing or predictable demand for more power. See id. at 32.
A 20% reserve margin for generating capacity is generally considered adequate. Critics
point out that the electric power industry currently has a reserve margin of 30.5%, 31,408
megawatts in excess of a reasonable reserve. ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOUNDATION, UTILITY
SCOREBOARD 11 (1978). A 37% figure has been published still more recently.
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOUNDATION, PowER LmE 6 (Nov. 1978). If investors do not feel
that new capacity will result in increased sales, they will be reluctant to invest, since
utility profits depend on generating enough sales to earn the full rate of return allowed
on investment. See note 48 infra, discussing the alleged tendency to over capitalize in the
public utility industry.
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stock,5 allowing companies to include construction work in prog-
ress in the rate base,' and permitting fuel adjustment clauses7 to
5. A sufficient return on common stock is crucial to the electric utility industry.
Many electric utility companies are close to a maximum leverage position, in which they
cannot without impairing the security of bondholders issue more debt without issuing
proportionate amounts of common stock. Sufficient earnings are needed to market the new
common stock issues at prices above book value. STUDY HEARINGS, supra note 4, at 43-50;
McDiarmid, The Rise and Decline of Electric Utility Credit, 95 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 19, 20
(1975). Regulatory commissions have directly responded to this need by increasing the
allowed rate of return on equity. The average allowed rate of return on equity in state
ratemaking decisions rose from 11.37% in 1970, see ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., STUDY OF
RETRNS ALLOWED IN ELECiuc UTILITY RATE CASES (August, 1972), to 13.14% in 1977; data
supplied to the author by Edison Elec. Inst. (August, 1978). In each case the information
is a simple average of the percent allowed in particular rate cases. It does not reflect
allowed percentages in cases not occurring in the particular year. The average yield on
Moody's 24 selected electric utilities rose from 5.94% in 1970 to 8.64% in 1976, perhaps
reflecting the overall increase in the allowed rate of return. Moody's Nationwide Survey
of Public Utility Progress 11 (1977).
6. This practice allows utilities to earn a return from ratepayers on plant not yet
actually serving them. Although very popular with utility companies, its popularity with
regulators may be on the wane. The Edison Electric Institute's Survey on Construction
Work in Progress in Rate Base, updated to Jan. 1, 1978, shows 22 states allowing 100% of
CWIP in the rate base, but this does not tell the whole story. The statistics reflect only
the number of states where CWIP has been allowed in one or more cases. There may be
other utilities in the same jurisdictions with no CWIP in the rate base. Although 14 state
commissions allowed CWIP for the first time during 1974-76, since then there has been
only one other state allowing CWIP, balanced by two states that revoked the former
allowance. Statistics from the same source indicate that approximately 13 states allow no
CWIP in the rate base, two allow only so much as will be operative within six months of
the test year, two allow it only for environmental control facilities, and the remainder
allow only a portion. Evidencing unusual public concern, CWIP has been prohibited by
voter initiative in Missouri, Mo. REv. STAT. § 393.135 (Vernon Supp. 1979), and Oregon,
ORE. REV. STAT. § 757 (1978).
Statistics cited throughout this article regarding the number of jurisdictions that
follow a particular ratemaking practice are not completely reliable for a number of rea-
sons. A particular commission may use different rules in different cases or may depart
from a general rule in a particular case. Generally, these statistics rely on the most recent
decision, although the majority of companies or the companies serving the most customers
may still be governed by a different rule, either because there has been no recent rate case
or because in a rate increase proceeding the company may have settled for something less
in one area in order to gain an advantage in another.
There are also definitional problems. For instance, is inclusion in the rate base of a
plant that will be completed within the next year after the test year allowance of construc-
tion work in progress, or merely a pro forma adjustment for known changes? Commissions
do not always agree. Although complete reliance on such statistics as these for current
regulatory practices is unwise, they do reflect recent trends.
7. The Federal Power Commission and approximately 42 states had adopted auto-
matic fuel adjustment clauses as of 1975, and, during 1974, these clauses accounted for
2/3 of the $8 billion in allowed electricity rate increases. Note, Due Process Restraints on
the Use of Automatic Adjustment Clauses in Utility Rate Schedules, 18 ARiz. L,. REv. 453,
453 n.1 (1976) (citing SuacoMi. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON INTER-
STATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT ON ELEcrmc UTILrrY FUEL ADjusTMENT CLAUSES,
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ensure the faster recovery of increased fuel expenses and thus
help utility companies keep earnings and cash flow levels higher
during periods of rising fuel costs and inflation.
Congress has given substantial assistance to electric utility
companies in the form of tax benefits, and has considered but not
adopted a direct federal guarantee of electric utility bonds.' Con-
gress has also assisted the utility companies in a way that entails
less direct federal financial entanglement. Electric power compa-
nies have been among the chief beneficiaries of several income tax
subsidies designed to stimulate capital investment generally, par-
ticularly the use of more rapid methods of depreciation 10 and the
allowance of investment tax credits.11 Moreover, these companies
may benefit from certain income tax accounting provisions that
operate to create a subsidy even though none may have been
intended. This occurs if the income tax law, whether federal or
state, allows deduction of expenses that the utility is required to
amortize for ratemaking purposes, resulting in a current tax de-
duction for the company. If the ratemaking body chooses to post-
pone the benefit of this tax deduction until the years in which the
expense itself is actually being amortized, the company receives
the present use of the money saved by the current tax deduction,
again helping to raise capital internally.2
The effect of each type of tax benefit to a regulated utility
company depends on the regulatory treatment given by the rate-
making body setting rates for each company. The different types
of tax benefits are discussed separately below, but, generally, to
94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 66 (Subcomm. Print 1975)). Of a projected $10.01 billion increase
in electric and gas rates during 1977 $6.52 billion was added by fuel adjustment clauses.
Electric and Gas Utility Rate and FuelAdjustment Clause Increases, 1977: Report on Fuel
Adjustment Clause Increases to Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations and Sub-
comm. on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services of the Senate Comm. on
GovernmentalAffairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). (The suggested 51% of pending electric
rate increase applications has been used to arrive at a projected total.)
The Federal Power Commission, frequently referred to in this article, was abolished
as a separate department, and a new Federal Energy Regulatory Commission established
within the Department of the Interior in 1977. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7171 (Supp. 1977). This
article at all times refers to the old Federal Power Commission, sometimes abbreviated
FPC, when that agency was the author of any action, rule, or opinion pertaining to the
subject.
8. M. WEIDENBAUM, supra note 2, at 430-31.
9. See STUDY HEAMNGS, supra note 4, at 66-70, 75, suggesting a preference for normal-
ization of tax benefits to direct federal loan guaranties.
10. I.R.C. § 167(b)(2)-(4) discussed in Part II. A., infra.
11. I.R.C. § 46, discussed in Part IV, infra.
12. See discussion in Part I, infra.
1979]
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the extent that a current tax benefit is "flowed through" the
utility's rates, the company receives a different kind of benefit
than if they are "normalized."13 If a tax benefit is flowed through,
the ratemaking body simply deducts an amount equal to the tax
benefit from the revenue allowed to be recovered by the company.
The company receives only the benefits attached to lower prices,
such as customer goodwill and possible larger sales based on
elasticity of demand. On the other hand, if a tax benefit is de-
ferred or normalized, the regulatory authority is allowing the cur-
rent customers to be charged for a fictitious tax; hence, the com-
pany, and its stockholders, receive a more tangible benefit in the
form of increased cash on hand, usable as internally generated
capital, at least until the deferred tax is actually paid to the
government. In 1974, the amount of federal income taxes that the
150 largest investor owned electric utilities charged their custom-
ers was 1.47 billion dollars in excess of the amount of taxes ac-
tually paid, lowering the taxes paid to 8.17% of their taxable
income." By 1976 the deferred tax excess for the 100 largest com-
panies was up to 2.08 billion dollars while their actual tax bill was
only 37.4 million dollars, and thirty of them paid no tax at all. 15
For all Class A & B electrical utilities, federal income taxes
dropped from 14.7% of revenue in 1955 to 1.3% in 1975.16 Congress
has allowed further increases in the tax benefits for future years.
7
Consequently, "normalization" has emerged as a major factor in
utility ratemaking.
The remainder of Part I of this article briefly describes the
ratemaking process and the effect of normalization. Part II.A.
discusses normalization of accelerated depreciation, its history,
and the initial responses of ratemaking bodies. Part II.B. fo-
cuses on the Internal Revenue Code amendment creating Section
167(l), which in most situations requires normalization of tax
13. "Normalization" describes a method of handling such tax benefits by deferring
them to later years. Arguably, the process does not achieve normality and therefore nor-
malization is a misleading term. Although normalization seems to mean something
slightly different for each type of tax benefit, a common element is that in each case the
normalized tax benefit is not immediately "flowed through," i.e., passed on directly to
the ratepayers in the form of lower rates.
14. ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOUNDATION, PHANToM TAXES IN YouR ELECTRIC BILL 26
(1976).
15. ENVIRONMENTAL AcTION FOUNDATION, UTMrY SCOREBOARD 16 (1978).
16. 123 CONG. REC., S13,931-32 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Metcalf).
17. See note 202 and accompanying text infra, for a discussion of the additional
liberalization and extension of the investment tax credit.
[Vol. 30
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benefits derived from accelerated depreciation, and discusses
the various misunderstandings that led to this result. Part II.C.
compares a related form of accelerated depreciation obtained by
shortening the useful life of property for tax depreciation. Part
II.D. evaluates the various legal and policy arguments concerning
normalization versus flow-through of accelerated depreciation
tax benefits. Taken together, Part II develops the argument
against normalization, using accelerated depreciation tax bene-
fits as a prototype. Part III discusses "Comprehensive Inter-
period Income Tax Allocation" and the normalization of bene-
fits resulting from current tax expense deductions relating to
items that must be amortized for rate purposes. Part IV describes
the normalization problems associated with investment tax
credits. Finally, Part V suggests that the relevant statutory and
constitutional standards prohibit normalization, despite those
Internal Revenue Code sections that would otherwise require it.
In discussing the operation and effect of these tax benefits,
the following ratemaking model is utilized: R= (r x B) +E. In this
equation, "R" is the revenue a regulatory authority allows to be
earned over a year; "r" is the rate of return on capital, which is a
percentage usually consisting of a weighted average of the actual
cost of embedded debt and a reasonable rate of return on equity;
"B" is the rate base, usually those assets of the company used and
usable in the provision of service to its customers; 8 and "E" is
the operating expenses, including depreciation allowance and
taxes. Almost all regulatory authorities set rates according to a
formula similar to this, which is applied to data collected or esti-
mated for a "test year," a period of 12 months operation of a
company. 9 The many additional complications of this formula
are irrelevant to this discussion and other methods of setting rates
will not be treated because variations of this method are so com-
monly in use. In setting rates, the regulatory authorities must
determine whether the tax benefits described above should be
flowed through to the ratepayers by corresponding reductions in
the operating expense section of the formula, reducing the
amount of revenue allowed to be collected by the companies, or
whether the amount of reduced taxes should be normalized, pro-
18. This was the general rule prior to the allowance of construction work in progress
in the rate base and is still the rule in many jurisdictions. E.g., Newport Gas & Light Co.,
85 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 257, 259 (R.I. P.U.C. 1970).
19. For a recent verbalization of the ratemaking formula, see New England Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 390 A.2a 8, 14 (Me. 1978).
1979]
5
Liberman: Normalized Taxes in Utility Rates: Giving Credits When None Are D
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw REvIEw
ducing at least a temporary source of investment capital for the
company. Additionally, the existence of this tax-free capital may
be recognized by reducing either the rate of return or the rate base
upon which a rate of return is allowed. The regulatory task is
further complicated by provisions in the tax code which purport
to deny some of these tax benefits unless they are normalized."0
In applying a formula such as this, regulatory bodies have
broad discretion. This article takes the position that courts and
ratemaking bodies must interpret certain legal requirements and
legal issues in determining the correct treatment of these tax
benefits for setting utility rates. Arguably there are no longer any
substantive due process restraints on economic regulation,2 and
a regulatory authority can constitutionally set whatever rates it
desires. Nevertheless, courts continue to hold that setting the
revenue requirement too low will deprive the utility company of
its property without due process of law, implying a corresponding
constitutional duty to ratepayers not to set the revenues too high.
Similar statutory standards govern rate determinations, requir-
ing that rates be "just and reasonable" while at the same time
providing a fair return, including allowance for surplus and con-
tingencies.2
The argument against the allowance of normalized taxes as
a cost of service rests on the theory that the allowance of unjusti-
fied expenses results in unlawful excess earnings to the company
in violation of these constitutional and statutory standards.
Thus, the legal purposes and methods of ratemaking require that
current tax benefits be passed through as much as possible to the
current ratepayers, and contrary ratemaking practices are incon-
sistent with these purposes. Since Congress has prohibited or
limited flow-through in at least two instances, the validity of
congressional use of the taxing power in this area must be scruti-
nized. To the extent that the tax laws create a rate subsidy,
Congress has taken over state regulation of rates; arguably, the
taxing power may not unduly interfere with a state regulatory
scheme. Moreover, by requiring the regulatory authorities to
allow fictitious expenses, Congress has created unreasonably high
20. I.R.C. §§ 167(l), 46(0.
21. E.g., Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934).
22. E.g., ME. REv. STAT., tit. 51 § 35; 47 N.Y. [PuB. SERv.] LAws (consol.) §§ 65.1,
72. See also Part V.A., infra.
708 [Vol. 30
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revenue returns to the utility companies in violation of the consti-
tutional precepts set down by the Supreme Court.?
I. NORMALIZATION OF TAX BENEFITS RELATED
To DEPRECIATION
A. Accelerated Deprecation
Accelerated depreciation is considered first because it has
been the subject of the most consideration by courts and commis-
sions. The discussion of accelerated depreciation in Section II will
include most of the factors applicable to the other types of de-
ferred tax benefits as well.
The first of these general factors applying to all normaliza-
tion is simply recognition of the problems incurred by using the
Internal Revenue Code to subsidize certain activities within the
nation's economy. It has been argued powerfully that this is a
form of subsidization that is inherently suspect, and a heavy
burden of proving the preferability of a tax subsidy to a direct
grant should be placed on tax subsidy proponentsY The primary
arguments against such subsidies are that although they cost the
taxpayers just as much as a direct grant they are not generally
considered as part of a budget,5 and they are not developed by
committees or administered by agencies that have expertise in
the substantive area to which they pertain."8 Further, the subsi-
dies are not likely to accomplish the governmental objective as
cheaply as possible because they tend to create windfalls,2 they
create inequities within the tax structure,21 and they confuse the
tax system. 29 Congress, however, continues to use these methods
of subsidy. It may actually be easier to enact and continue a tax
incentive than it is to furnish a direct grant precisely because the
amount of the benefit is not calculated or listed in the federal
budget, and because the benefit comes with limited or ineffective
federal regulation.
Accelerated depreciation was initially enacted as a stimulus
to equipment and machinery investments as part of the Internal
23. These arguments are developed in Parts V.A. and V.B., infra.
24. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Com-
parison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705, 734 (1970).
25. Id. at 729-31.
26. Id. at 728-29.
27. Id. at 719-20.
28. Id. at 720-25.
29. Id. at 731.
1979]
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Revenue Code of 1954.30 Undoubtedly, a direct grant to all firms
allowing the purchase of new equipment and machinery would
have been very difficult to enact or administer, even if consti-
tutional. Assuming it could be done, tax problems would still be
associated with a direct grant. For example, should a direct grant
be taxable as income in the year received or treated as a nontaxa-
ble gift or contribution to capital,31 and should future deprecia-
tion expense deductions be allowed? 2
For whatever reasons, Congress proceeded via a tax subsidy.
Problems may arise from grants made in this form simply be-
cause the subsidy is tied to something already within the tax
structure. In this case the benefit is tied to depreciation, which
is itself a complicated subject. 3 All depreciation is a fictitious
expense in the sense that no cash payments are made or allo-
cated. The concept of depreciation is predicated on the imper-
manence of equipment and plant purchased for use in a business
which results from physical wear and tear (the effects of use,
chemical action, wind, heat, cold, etc.) and functional variables
(obsolescence, changed operating conditions, etc.) .3 Since a
firm's capital is invested in these assets, the capital would in a
sense eventually be used up by this physical and functional de-
generation, unless sufficient income is earned to replace it.
Viewed in one way, earnings are overstated unless depreciation
is considered, because the capital would be depleted in the pro-
cess of operating. Viewed another way, earnings are understated
by taking depreciation, because a company is earning not only its
stated return but an additional amount to maintain or replace its
capital. However one views the questions, it is now generally
accepted that physical assets wear out or become obsolete, and
therefore some form of depreciation should be recognized in ac-
counting for financial operations.
30. I.R.C. § 167; see Swiren, Accelerated Depreciation Tax Benefits in Utility Rate
Making, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 629, 629-30 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Swiren].
31. See Frolik, Section 118 and the Tax Treatment of Nonshareholder Contribution
to Capital, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 499 (1977), for a general discussion of taxability of nonshare-
holder contributions, including governmental grants.
32. Id. at 524-25 (discussing I.R.C. § 118(b), which requires customers' contributions
in aid of construction to water and sewage companies to be treated as nontaxable capital
contributions and denies depreciation or investment tax credit for federal income tax
purposes).
33. See generally J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PuBLic UTmrrY RATES 192-223 (1961).
34. P. MASON, PRINCIPLES OF PuBrac UTIIrTY DEPRECIATION, AmE icAN AccOUNTING
ASSOCIATION MONOGRAPH No. 1, 2 (1937).
[Vol. 30
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Although recognition of depreciation expense does not pro-
duce any cash flow,35 it does suggest in a rough way this consump-
tion of assets, particularly since the accumulated depreciation
must be shown on the balance sheet either as a liability or as a
set-off to the assets in question. To the extent earnings are suffi-
cient, a firm is likely to retain a portion of them to balance the
loss of asset value from this depreciation.
The depreciation allowance itself does not correspond pre-
cisely to the amount of wear and tear or obsolescence, but it is
generally calculated by estimating the useful life of an asset, and
dividing its net cost (usually original cost less estimated salvage
value) in some rational manner over, the years of the useful life
of the asset.36 This results in an apportionment of the total ex-
pense over a period that relates to the service life of each asset.
The most common method is straight-line depreciation which
allocates the depreciation expense into an equal amount for each
year of the life of the asset. 7
The most common alternatives to stiaight-line depreciation
are double-declining balance and sum-of-the-years' digits meth-
ods, each of which increases substantially the amount of depre-
ciation claimed in earlier years and decreases it in later years
relative to straight-line depreciation., The popularity of these
methods is largely a consequence of their acceptance in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.39 In some instances these alternatives may be
employed because the equipment is actually used more in its
earlier years and therefore allocating more of the expense to these
years is proper, tax considerations aside."0
Although a strong argument can be made against tax recog-
nition of depreciation because earnings used to replace capital are
just as much income as earnings used to pay dividends, deprecia-
tion has for some time been recognized as a deductible expense
for tax purposes.' Assuming that depreciation is to be an allow-
35. G. THOMPSON, R. WHrrFmAN, E. PmLLps & W. WARREN, ACCOUNTING AND THE LAw
355 (4th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as G. THOMPSON].
36. Id. at 356. It is also possible to handle depreciation on a unit basis or by simply
observing wear and tear; however, these methods are rarely used. Id. at 358-59.
37. Id. at 356.
38. Id. at 357-58. See I.R.C. § 167(b)(2)-(3). The Internal Revenue Service also allows
acceleration of depreciation by shortening for tax purposes the estimated useful lives of
certain assets. See Part II.C., infra.
39. G. THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 357.
40. Swiren, supra note 30, at 629-30.
41. Depreciation was apparently prohibited as an expense in the Income Act of 1894,
1979]
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able tax deduction, there is no sound reason why it should not
be allowed to utility companies as well as other businesses.
The use of more rapid income tax depreciation as a stimulus
to investment in plant and equipment, however, raises certain
theoretical problems. Logically, regulated industries should not
receive subsidies such as accelerated depreciation. Since regu-
lated businesses exist and are given monopoly privileges in return
for meeting a public demand, their output and growth should
relate to and be governed by that demand. If the capital expendi-
tures of utility companies generated by liberalized depreciation
exceeds that required by public demand, the consumer will have
to bear the expense of this unnecessary plant expansion. Since
regulated utilities have a duty to supply all reasonable customer
demand within their service area," they will have to build neces-
sary plant addition anyway, and the commissions are required to
let them earn enough to attract the necessary capital.43 Therefore,
any further subsidy is misplaced and creates a windfall.
Congress has, however, included regulated utilities among
the beneficiaries of this tax reduction." The original inclusion of
regulated companies may have resulted in part from their inclu-
sion as beneficiaries of earlier income tax provisions allowing ac-
celerated amortization of the construction costs of certain facili-
ties certified by the proper defense agency as urgently necessary.45
Since the Korean War effort required more electric plant con-
struction to provide power for the production of military equip-
Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553, which was later held unconstitutional
in Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). Depreciation was not men-
tioned in six earlier tax laws, but was allowed as a deduction by the Tariff Act of 1913,
ch. 16, § II(B), (G)(b) 38 Stat. 167, 172, and by subsequent acts. See Lischer, Depreciation
Policy: Whither Thou Goest, 32 S.W.L.J. 545, 550-51 (1978).
42. 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PuBIc UTILT REGULATION 227-33 (1969). E.g., United
Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 278 U.S. 300, 309 (1929); Messer v. S. Airways Sales
Co., 245 Ala. 462, 17 So. 2d 679 (1944); IowA CODE ANN. § 490A(3) (Supp. 1978); N.Y.
[PuB. SEaV.] LAw (consol.) § 65; Wis. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 196.03(1) (West 1957).
43. The building of new plants is required if necessary to meet customer demand
and is subject to state licensing regulation. E.g., N.Y. [PuB. SERv.] LAw (consol.) § 66.
Moreover, the regulators must see to it that rates provide sufficient earnings to enable the
company to raise capital needed for new plants. E.g., The United Fuel Gas Co., 46 PuB.
U. REp. 3d (PUR) 118, 123 (W. Va. P.S.C. 1962), ME. REv. STAT. tit. 35, § 51.
44. Apparently Congress did not initially give any particular consideration to the
effect on or applicability of accelerated depreciation to regulated industries. Swiren, supra
note 30, at 631.
45. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, Ch. 2, § 23(t), 54 Stat. 996 (later I.R.C. § 168, repealed
Pub. L. No. 94-455, tit. XIX, § 1951(b)(4)(A), 90 Stat. 1837 (1976)). Although this section
was not repealed until 1976, no new certifications were made after 1959.
[Vol. 30
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ment and since the emergency need for these facilities required
very rapid expansion of plants, the inclusion of electric utilities
within the scope of this tax subsidy to provide cash flow more
quickly than could be done through the normal rate procedures
is arguably more defensible. This argument applies with less
force, if at all, to Section 167 accelerated depreciation, which does
not originate from the same kind of emergency."8
An argument for allowing accelerated depreciation to utili-
ties may be based on welfare grounds; by subsidizing the utilities,
Congress, if not stimulating investment, is at least keeping utility
prices down. The validity of this argument, however, depends
largely on subsequent ratemaking decisions. To the extent that
normalization defers or eliminates the benefits, the current rate-
payers are not helped. 7 Moreover, any tax savings currently or
ultimately passed on to ratepayers will be harmful if the incentive
stimulates construction of unnecessary facilities. The tax savings
in expenses will be equalled or overshadowed by the higher rates
of return needed to attract the capital "for such construction.
Other incentives for overexpansion already exist in the utility
regulatory system itself, aside from tax benefits."8 If the purpose
is lower rates, the ratepayers would derive greater assistance from
simply lowering or removing the taxes on utilities without attach-
ing these benefits to construction programs, or by awarding the
46. See Pennsylvania Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Citizens Water Co., 13 Pus. U. REP. 3d
(PUR) 189, 220 (Pa. P.U.C. 1955). Swiren argues to the contrary that there is no discern-
ible distinction between the cases allowing normalization of the wartime facilities amor-
tization and those allowing accelerated depreciation benefits under I.R.C. § 167. Swiren,
supra note 30, at 647.
47. It has also been demonstrated by mathematical simulation that under growth
conditions, normalization results in higher electric rate charges to consumers than flow-
through. Brigham, The Effects of Alternative Tax Depreciation Policies on Public Utility
Rate Structure, 20 NAT. TAX J. 204, 213 (1967); E. BIGHAM & J. PAPPAS, LmEALIZED
DEPRECIATION AND CAPITAL CosTs 86-91 (1970). Brigham and Pappas also conclude, how-
ever, that flow-through treatment results in higher cost of capital. Id. at 92.
48. Arguably, regulated firms tend to over build in general. Since profits are regu-
lated the managerial incentives lie in growth of sales rather than growth of profits. In
addition, the regulatory system itself may encourage unnecessary expansion. See Averch
and Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 10,
52 (1962). The legal requirement that commissions grant a reasonable return on invest-
ment causes utility company management to make that investment in situations where a
competing firm would hesitate. E. BERLIN, C. CicHm & W. GLEN, PERSPECTIVE ON
POWER 59-60 (1974); 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMIcs OF REGULATION 50-54 (1971). The Averch-
Johnson thesis has been supported by empirical studies confirming the overcapitalization
hypothesis. Spann, Rate of Return Regulation and Efficiency in Production: An Empiri-
cal Test of the Averch-Johnson Thesis, 5 BLL J. 35 (1974).
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benefits only to the utilities that do not overbuild.49
Satisfactory policy grounds for granting accelerated depre-
ciation tax benefits to utilities are difficult to find. Congress,
however, has not only continued to allow utilities to take acceler-
ated depreciation for tax purposes, but has specifically recognized
it and has all but required normalization, thereby preventing the
tax benefits from being flowed through to the current ratepay-
ers.
0
From its inception, accelerated depreciation for tax purposes
proved irresistable to many utilities because of their heavy invest-
ment in new and replacement equipment." If a utility company
elected to accept the tax benefits of accelerated depreciation, the
regulatory handling of the tax benefit raised a ratemaking prob-
lem. Although there was a flurry of normalization at the begin-
ning, over the early period as a whole many regulators took the
position that the benefits had to be flowed through to ratepayers
because a company could not claim any more tax expense than
its actual tax liability." Many companies, however, preferred to
49. The late Senator Lee Metcalf became so alarmed at normalization that starting
in 1975 he advocated eliminating the federal income tax on utilities altogether. See S.
2028, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. Rac. 13,931-33 (Aug. 5, 1977), introduced by Met-
calf, and H.R. 8897, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. REc. 8779 (Aug. 5, 1977), introduced
by Rep. Stark, which would exempt privately owned electric utilities from federal income
tax on utility operations and replace the tax with an excise on kilowatt hour usage. The
idea of eliminating or reducing taxes on utilities is not a new one. Since the utilities exist
to provide services deemed necessary to the public, an argument can be made that taxing
them is simply raising the cost of necessary services. Arguably, however, the tax on
utilities should not differ from that imposed on nonutilities, lest an improper allocation
of resources result. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 33, at 404; C. PHILLnPS, THE ECONOMICS OF
THE REGULATION 211 (1969).
Although much electricity may be used for purposes of luxury and for the production
of unnecessary goods or services, there is a certain portion that is used for basic necessities
such as light and refrigeration. Phillips suggests that since industrial customers are more
elastic than residential customers in their demand for electricity, industrial rates tend to
be lower, causing a larger percentage of the tax burden to fall on residential customers.
Id. at 210.
50. See Part ll.B. infra.
51. Swiren, supra note 30, at 630; What Others Think: Thoughts on Accelerated
Depreciation, 62 Pun. UTIL. FORT. 265 (Aug. 14, 1958), stating that 64 out of 80 companies
used accelerated depreciation only four years after its enactment.
52. Central Maine Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 153 Me. 228, 136 A.2d 726
(1957) (refusing to read § 167 as providing interest-free loans from the ratepayers through
present payment of deferred tax); Joplin Water Works Co., 20 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 195,
203 (Mo. P.S.C. 1957) (commission not authorized to allow more than the actual test year
income tax liability as an operating expense); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 18
PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 523 (N.H.P.U.C. 1957) (taxes actually paid are the proper ex-
pense); Plainfield Union Water Co., 57 N.J. Super. 158, 154 A.2d 201 (1959); Lea County
12
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normalize the taxes by collecting revenue from the ratepayers in
early years and creating a reserve account to pay the heavier taxes
that might result in later years. This confers an advantage on the
company and the stockholders by giving them the free use of the
ratepayers' money until the additional taxes are due. In its ideal
form, from the investors' view, this ratepayer capital from de-
ferred taxes could earn further money by its inclusion in the
company rate base that determines the amount of return. 3 A
third, compromise view was that the deferred taxes would be
allowed as an expense, but excluded from rate base or not allowed
to earn a return. 54 This view later prevailed in most jurisdictions,
after a series of developments had led to further changes in the
Internal Revenue Code favoring normalization.
B. " Congressional Action Limiting Availability of Accelerated
Depreciation Unless Normalized
In 1957, the Maine Public Utilities Commission disallowed
normalization.55 Subsequently, a Maine utility elected to discon-
tinue using accelerated depreciation for taxes. In a rate increase
Gas Co., 10 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 279, 289 (N.M.P.S.C. 1955) (normalization would
require current ratepayers to bear more than their fair share of cost of plant); Pennsyl-
vania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Citizens Water Co., 13 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 189, 222 (Pa.
P.U.C. 1955) (disallowing normalization because principal purpose of liberalized deprecia-
tion was not particularly applicable to regulated public utilities). Contra, Public Serv. Co.
of Indiana, Inc., 12 Pu. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 509, 515 (Ind. P.S.C. 1956) (Congress intended
to stimulate expansion of industry by providing interest-free loans); Western Kentucky
Gas Co., 21 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 394, 399 (Ky. P.S.C. 1957); Amere Gas Utilities Co.,
15 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 339 (F.P.C. 1956); Oklahoma Nat. Gas Co., 12 Pu. U. REP. 3d
(PUR) 293, 295 (Okla. Corp. Comm'n. 1955).
53. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 33, at 220. The FPC for a time allowed inclusion in rate
base of all plants and equipment purchased with funds from the deferred tax reserve. Re
Treatment of Federal Income Taxes Affected by Accelerated Amortization, 2 Pua. U. REP.
3d (PUR) 41, 45 (F.P.C. 1953) (concerning I.R.C. § 168 benefits); accord, Panhandle
Eastern Pipe Line Co., 3 Pu. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 396, 429 (F.P.C. 1954) (concerning I.R.C.
§ 167 accelerated depreciation benefits); Public Serv. Co. of Indiana, 12 PUB. U. REP. 3d
(PUR) 509 (Ind. P.S.C. 1956) (concerning accelerated depreciation). At a later time the
FPC allowed a reduced rate of return of 1.5% on capital generated by the deferred tax
reserve. Northern Nat. Gas Co., 38 Pu. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 149 (F.P.C. 1961); Panhandle
Eastern Pipe Line Co., 25 F.P.C. 550 (1961), aff'd sub nom., Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 316 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Still later the FPC allowed
no return at all. See note 81 infra.
54. E.g., Western Kentucky Gas Co., 21 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 394, 399 (Ky. P.S.C.
1957).
55. Central Maine Power Co., 17 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 452 (Me. P.U.C. 1957), aff'd
sub nom., Central Maine Power Co. v. Maine Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 153 Me. 288, 136 A.2d
726 (1957).
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proceeding, the commission refused to allow the increased taxes
incurred by the company's use of straight-line depreciation as
proper costs of service, stating:
rate regulation cannot be frustrated by a requirement imposing
extravagant or unnecessary costs on ratepayers. Acker v. United
States (1936) 298 U.S. 426, 430. . . . In this proceeding we are
convince.d that a tax savings, which may be availed of without
any risk, is available to management. Commissions have fre-
quently made hypothetical adjustments to debt ratios in test
year computations for ratemaking purposes. In the same light
we believe that the revenue requirements of Bangor Hydro
should be computed to reflect the use of accelerated deprecia-
tion even though the company elects to pay a higher tax than it
is liable for. Under the facts of this case, we would be remiss in
the exercise of our paramount function of rate-making were we
to decide otherwise
6
California was the first state to actually impute accelerated
depreciation with flow-through to a company which had never
taken accelerated depreciation for taxes at all.57 Other jurisdic-
tions adopted this approach, refusing to allow full actual taxes as
an expense when a company utilized straight-line depreciation on
the grounds that the company's management was not using its
best judgment to minimize costs and therefore the rates including
the higher tax costs were not just and reasonable. 8 Meanwhile,
the Federal Power Commission (FPC) reversed its original posi-
tion favoring normalization" to one favoring flow-through in the
56. Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., 26 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 489, 494-95 (Me. P.U.C.
1958). See also Glassman, Objections to Taking Liberalized Depreciation, 77 Pus. UTIL.
Foirr. 29,37 (1966); Lewis, The Duty of a Public Utility to Reduce Its Income Tax Liability
by Using Accelerated Depreciation, 35 LAND EcoN. 104-14 (1958).
57. General Tel. Co. of Cal., 80 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 2, 50-51 (Cal. P.U.C. 1969);
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 77 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 1 (Cal. P.U.C. 1968).
58. E.g., Colorado Mun. League v. Colorado Pub. Util. Comm'n, 172 Colo. 188, 473
P.2d 960 (1970), reversing in part, Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 76 PUB. U. REP. 3d
(PUR) 481 (Colo. P.U.C. 1969); Southern New England Tel. Co., 78 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR)
504, 520 (Conn. P.U.C. 1969). Utah recognized the desirability of using accelerated depre-
ciation to reduce rates but did not directly impute such benefits. Mountain Fuel Supply
Co., 76 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 277, 288 (Utah P.S.C. 1968). New York indicated a prefer-
ence for accelerated depreciation with normalization over straight-line, but declined to do
more than take into consideration the utility's refusal to adopt accelerated depreciation
in setting its rate of return. New York Tel. Co., 84 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 321 (N.Y.P.S.C.
1970).
59. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 29 PUB. U. REp. 3d (PUR) 469 (F.P.C. 1959), aff'd sub nom.,
El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 281 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1960); Amere Gas
Utile. Co., 15 Pus. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 339 (F.P.C. 1956).
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Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. case,"0 and it thereafter pro-
hibited a natural gas company from switching back to straight-
line depreciation for- taxes." Ironically, the regulatory commis-
sions helped create a situation in which utilities were forced to
take advantage of a tax subsidy that never should have been
applicable to them in the first place. In doing so, the commissions
probably correctly applied the law, but they also created pressure
for a change in the law.
Congress amended Section 167 in 1969.62 Congress was ap-
parently concerned about loss of revenue from utilities flowing
through the tax deduction and thus lowering their taxable in-
come. 3 A loss of revenue in granting a tax benefit such as this,
however, would appear to be foreseeable by Congress. On the
other hand, as stated above, this tax loss is not justified because
of the windfall nature of the tax benefits for utilities. 4 This prob-
lem could be resolved easily by prohibiting utilities from employ-
ing accelerated depreciation." Instead, Congress extended the
subsidy, but, to a great extent, required normalization. Because
this and similar legislation requiring normalization may result
from a misunderstanding, the concept behind this legislative his-
tory is discussed in detail here before considering the legislation
itself.
Up to this point, some utility companies had elected to re-
main on straight-line depreciation because of the unpredictable
regulatory results and a fear of heavy tax loads in later years if
flow-through should be required. These companies, including the
Bell System, naturally felt it unfair for a commission to impute
the tax benefits of accelerated depreciation to them, and they
were perhaps justified in seeking relief from Congress. Unfortun-
ately, the form of the relief enacted-mandatory normaliza-
tion-rested and probably still rests on the mistaken contention
60. 31 F.P.C. 208 (F.P.C. 1964), affd sub noma., Alabama-Tennessee Nat. Gas Co. v.
F.P.C., 359 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 847 (1966).
61. Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 388 F.2d 44 (7th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 928 (1968). See generally Welch, Washington Outlook
for Utilities in 1969, 83 PuB. UTIL. FoRT 15, 18 (Jan. 16, 1969).
62. Int. Rev. Code of 1969, § 441, 83 Stat. 625 (now I.R.C. § 167(l)).
63. H. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1969); S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 172 (1969).
64. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
65. The FPC itself recommended this in Amere, 15 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 339, 340
(F.P.C. 1956) although at that time it felt bound to allow accelerated depreciation.
1979]
15
Liberman: Normalized Taxes in Utility Rates: Giving Credits When None Are D
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw
that the Treasury suffers a double loss of taxes if flow-through is
used.
In setting rates, a commission must grant a rate sufficient to
obtain the desired net revenue after taxes. If current revenues are
deficient, the commission must grant an increase in double the
amount of the deficiency to allow for an approximate fifty percent
tax rate on all new dollars of revenue allowed. If this computation
is made after all other expenses have been "netted out," it might
appear that by flowing through the extra tax deduction a commis-
sion effectively lowers the rates by the amount of the deduction
plus an approximately equal amount to pay the income taxes
while still leaving the company with the allowed increase. Al-
though this could possibly happen, it is largely a matter of com-
putation. If the commission computes the amount of taxes by
increasing the amount of the depreciation deduction only once,
there is no double loss of dollars to the Treasury, and this be-
comes a false issue.
In lobbying for the 1969 amendment, the Bell System relied
heavily on this alleged double tax loss. Its primary witness, Rob-
ert R. Nathan, stated that under flow-through regujatory prac-
tice, the tax deferral is viewed as additional earnings. Further,
since at a fifty percent tax rate it takes revenue equal to twice the
benefit to earn it net of taxes, he stated that the regulators feel
free to reduce revenue by twice the tax, causing the government
to lose twice the amount of taxes that it would lose if just the
amount of the benefit was deducted from allowed revenue.6 Mr.
Nathan admitted that there is no "double loss" if the commission
simply flows through the tax benefit." His statement that the
regulatory commissions feel free to reduce revenue by twice the
tax benefit is unsupported and appears to be incorrect."
The regulatory commissions generally compute the revenue
requirement by calculating the necessary net return after taxes
and simply doubling the dollar result to account for a fifty per-
cent tax rate. This calculation involves the "r x B" section of the
66. Proposed Tax Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Comm. on Ways and
Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 3655, 3665-66, 3695-96 (1968) (statement of Robert R. Na-
than) [hereinafter cited as Nathan]. See also Proposed Tax Reform Act: Hearing on H.R.
5 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. 13270, 4979 (1969)
(letter of A.L. Stott, V.P. and comptroller of AT&T, to Chairman Long).
67. Nathan, supra note 66, at 3696.
68. Conversations in March and April 1978 with K. Turner, then a staff member of
the Missouri P.S.C. indicated that in practice the tax benefits under flow-through rate-
making are only deducted once. The reasons are developed in the text.
[Vol. 30
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formula. Expenses that are deductible for tax purposes are simply
added at their face value to arrive at the appropriate gross reve-
nue requirement. To the extent that an item of expense is in-
cluded in the required revenue that is not deductible for tax pur-
poses, it must also be doubled because it will be taxed. Items that
are deductible for tax purposes, but not included as costs of serv-
ice for rate purposes, can easily be accounted for by simply reduc-
ing the tax already calculated. Mr. Nathan set forth the following
ostensibly plausible examples:
Examples of Doubling Effect of Flow-Through
Assume: Rate base $1,000
Tax rate 50%
Example I - Straight-line depreciation, book and tax
Books Tax
1. Revenues $260 $260
2. Depreciation 100 100
3. Income before tax (1-2) 160 160
4. Tax 80 80
5. Earnings (3-4) 80
6. Rate of return on $1,000 rate base 8%
Example II - Assume an additional $40 of tax depreciation is deduct-
ed, with normalization
Books Tax
1. Revenues $260 $260
2. Depreciation 100 140
3. Reserved for deferred tax
(normalization) 20
4. Income before tax (1-2+3) 140 120
5. Tax 60 60
6. Earnings (4-5) 80
7. Return on $1,000 rate base 8%
Example III - Assume an additional $40 of tax depreciation is de-
ducted, with flow-through
Books Tax
1. Revenues $260 $260
2. Depreciation 100 140
3. Income before tax (1-2) 160 120
4. Tax 60 60
5. Earnings (3-4) 100
6. Rate of return on $1,000 rate base 10%
If a 10% rate of return is deemed proper, then there would be no
doubling effect from flow-through. It would mean, of course, that in
order to obtain this permissable [sic] 10% rate of return, the com-
pany had to use up its tax basis prematurely in order to generate the
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additional cash flow, and then itreat that cash flow as the equivalent
of earnings.
Example IV - Same as Example III, except revenues and taxes are
reduced to produce a rate of retun [sic] of 8%.
Books TAX
1. Revnues [sic] $220 $220
2. Depreciation 100 140
3. Income before tax (1-2) 120 80
4. Tax 40 40
5. Earnings (3-4) 80
6. Rate of rate base return on $1,000 8%
To summarize, in Example I, taxes were $80 and the rate of return was
8 percent.
In Example II, taxes are $60 because depreciation was accelerated,
but the rate of return remains at 8 percent because the tax deferral
of $20 is listed as a cost in the normalization reserve.
In Example III, accelerated depreciation again reduces taxes by $20
but the rate of return is deemed to be 10 percent because the tax de-
ferral is not flowed-through.
In Example IV, accelerated depreciation is used with flow-through.
Revenue requirements are adjusted to bring the Tate of return down to
8 percent, which reduces taxes by an additional $20 for a -total of $40.
Thus, in Example IV tax payments are only one-half of those in Ex-
ample I, where straight-line depreciation is used for both book and tax
purposes.69
His example IV makes the same incorrect assumption as his
statement by reducing the tax a double amount. Example III,
although denominated "flow-through," is really not, because the
ratepayers are charged the same amount. To calculate flow-
through, a commission in this example would reduce "earnings"
by the $20 tax savings, thus keeping the rate of return of eight
percent instead of ten percent. Gross revenue would be adjusted
down to reflect this $20 and only this amount. Example II, de-
noted normalization, includes a deferred tax of $20 that is
charged to the ratepayer, illustrating that under normalization
the real rate of return is ten percent before the crossover point and
six percent afterwards, a distortion that penalizes ratepayers in
the earlier period. Similarly, if a commission did use the method
of example IV, revenue would have to rise to $300 after the cross-
over point in order to maintain the eight percent return. This dis-
tortion provides one of the reasons that commissions should not
69. Nathan, supra note 66, at 3695-96.
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compute flow-through as Mr. Nathan testified.
A second deficiency in Mr. Nathan's figures is that they only
cover one year and do not take into account the loss in tax dollars
from the reduction in rate base created by the deduction of de-
ferred taxes and subsequent lower depreciation expenses. Over
the long run, taking the rate base adjustment into account will
usually result not in a loss of revenue, but in a net gain of tax
dollars under flow-through."0
There is a possible circularity in the ratemaking formula
which contributes to the confusion. In setting out the basic rate-
making equation as R = (r x B) + E, taxes are included as an
operating expense under "E", which is consistent with ratemak-
ing procedures. If we ignore other expenses, as we can for purposes
of this discussion, the formula to compute the required revenue
is simply R = (r x B) + T; "R" is the revenue allowed, "r" is the
rate of return, "B" is the rate base, and "T" is the federal income
taxes. To compute the taxes, however, the formula is T = t x R;
"t" is the tax rate. Obviously, "R" and "T" are interdependent
variables. To illustrate, assume that r x B = $100, t = 50%, r =
10%, and B = $1,000. The gross revenue requested is $100 (r x B)
plus $50 (taxes computed as t x R). But if R is $150, then a tax
rate of fifty percent results in a $75 tax; therefore, R becomes
$175, and at the next stage T becomes $87.50, with the process
repeating itself indefinitely.
Because rates are always set prospectively, the contention
that when a company is earning at or over the maximum allowed
in the rate proceeding the extra dollars will be taxable at the
maximum rate is correct. This is true regardless of whether the
company is allowed to take any accelerated depreciation, and it
is stretching the truth to say that the Treasury loses an extra
amount because of the flow-through of tax benefits used pre-
viously in computing the "allowable" rate of return. If, for exam-
ple, the tax code declared a tax benefit equal to a reduction of
fifty percent, the tax in the previous example would be $25 not
$50. If flowed through, the revenue requirement would be reduced
70. Pollock, The Effect of Alternative Regulatory Treatment of Tax Depreciation on
Utility Tax Payments, 26 NAT. TAx J. 43 (1973).
However critical I may be of Mr. Nathan's testimony, I am forced to admit that he
earned his pay. The Bell System, which switched over to accelerated depreciation after
the enactment of I.R.C. § 167(l), presently gathers in over $2.5 billion in deferred taxes
annually. President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals, Hearings Before Ways
and Means Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 2034 (1978) (statement of R. Batinovich).
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to $25 and the tax at the second stage of the circle would be fifty
percent of $125, or $62.50. If normalized, the tax would be fifty
percent of $150, or $75. The difference is $12.50 or exactly fifty
percent, which is equivalent to the fifty percent tax rate on the
extra $25 tax benefit. The apparent double loss arises only by
comparing the $62.50 tax on the flow-through basis to the $87.50
tax on the normalization basis, including the extra $25 of income
created by the circularity; however, this is money that the Treas-
ury would be able to tax only because of the circularity in the first
place. The extra loss does not arise from flow-through, but from
the circular structure that would arise if the commission pro-
ceeded by setting a gross revenue requirement rather than a net
revenue requirement. The extra $12.50 amounts to taxes on in-
come raised only for the purpose of paying taxes. It is hard to call
this a real loss of money to the Treasury. Even if commissions
were required to set rates in this way, the extra tax money would
not result from the normalization, but from the increase in total
revenue necessary to pay the tax in the second stage of the cir-
cularity. Requiring regulated industries to raise additional reve-
nues solely to produce more tax money seems to be putting the
cart before the horse and perverting the purpose of the tax laws,
which is to base taxes on income rather than basing income on
taxes.
To a certain extent this circularity exists if the company
earns more revenue than it was allowed, because the additional
money is taxed at the fifty percent rate. The taxable dollars that
result from normalization may help out the Treasury if the com-
pany does overearn, but it really has nothing to do with these
extra earnings, except that the normalization process creates
some taxable dollars which the commission must double in set-
ting rates. These double dollars might make up the lack of double
dollars resulting from overearning, but the so-called loss arises
from the overearning and not from the lack of normalization.
Interestingly, the House Report went no further than to state that
there is a double loss of revenue if a company is already earning
the maximum allowed by its regulatory commission." In infla-
tionary times, of course, the companies are hard pressed to earn
even the maximum allowed.
Congress also appears to have been motivated by a desire to
freeze existing practices and to prevent any further shift toward
accelerated depreciation, while at the same time precluding com-
71. H. REP. No. 413, supra note 63, at 132.
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missions from imputing accelerated depreciation with flow-
through to companies that did not elect this option.72 The statute
that was adopted, however, allows either straight-line or acceler-
ated depreciation with normalization, but severely limits flow-
through. Section 167(l) makes it impossible for a utility to bene-
fit from accelerated depreciation for taxes if it flows through the
benefits to the ratepayers, except with regard to property ac-
quired prior to 1970 on which accelerated depreciation with flow-
through was used73 or property acquired after 1969 that is of the
same or similar kind to that on which the company had been
using flow-through prior to 1970. 71 Moreover, the section specifi-
cally allows a company to elect not to use flow-through on prop-
erty acquired after 1969, even if it is of the same or similar kind
on which flow-through was previously used, if the new property
increases the company's operating capacity rather than replaces
existing facilities. 75 Thus the Code made it possible for the com-
pany to override a regulatory order by its election, which would
cut off the flow-through option on expansion property. If the regu-
latory commission refuses to approve normalization, the only
other option is straight-line depreciation. By limiting required
flow-through to those cases in which flow-through had actually
been in use, Congress precluded the commissions from attribut-
ing flow-through to companies that chose normalization.
7
1
Although the specific provision covering post-1969 expan-
sion property could arguably be read as implying no option to
elect normalization for pre-1970 property and post-1969 re-
placement property similar to that on which benefits were
previously flowed through, the Federal Power Commission, in
another turnabout, allowed a company to switch from flow-
through to normalization on such property also.77 The court of
72. H. REP. No. 413, supra note 63, S. REP. No. 552, supra note 63, at 172.
73. I.R.C. § 167(l)(1) (B). This law also allowed the companies to elect to switch to
flow-through on pre-1970 property if it filed a timely election prior to Aug. 1, 1969.
§ 167(/)(4)(B). With respect to imputed flow-through, ironically the Supreme Court of
California continued to impute flow-through to at least one company on the basis that a
company's failure to elect that option when it was available constituted imprudent man-
agement. City of San Francisco v. Public Util. Comm'n, 6 Cal. 3d 119, 125-26, 490 P.2d
798, 801, 98 Cal. Rptr. 286, 291-92 (1971). The California P.U.C. has since given in to
normalization while reducing the windfall earnings in another manner. See note 88 infra.
74. I.R.C. § 167(/)(2)(C).
75. I.R.C. § 167(/)(4)(A).
76. But see note 73 supra, concerning companies which failed to exercise the option
for flow-through when it was available.
77. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 84 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 193, 196-97 (F.P.C.
19791
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appeals reversed,"8 but the Supreme Court upheld the com-
mission's interpretation.79 Under section 167(l) it is now possible
for a utility to switch from flow-through to normalization, but
not from normalization to flow-through, without altogether losing
accelerated depreciation tax benefits, except possibly when flow-
through was used prior to 1969.
The FPC was obliged to give more consideration to section
167(l) than state regulatory commissions, because the 1969
amendment arguably overrules any older federal regulatory stat-
ute that might have been interpreted to require flow-through.
Since Congress does not generally regulate or set intrastate rates,
state regulators may not be bound by the terms of this statute in
setting rates. The language does apply to state ratemaking, how-
ever, and the tendency has been for the state commissions to
allow normalization on the theory that the current ratepayers will
pay the same if straight-line depreciation is used for tax purposes
and the companies might as well get the benefit." In doing this,
the commissions have now generally excluded the deferred tax
reserve from the rate base or precluded it from earning any re-
turn.,,
1970). The FPC later required flow-through on such properties, although not required to
do so. See Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 10 PUB. U. RP. 3d (PUR) 351, 353 (1975). Still later,
however, the FPC by rule adopted normalization of these and other benefits. See Order
530 discussed in Part III.
78. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 462 F.2d 853 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), revs'g Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 84 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 193 (1970).
79. Federal Power Comm'n v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Co., 411 U.S. 458 (1973),
reus'g Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 462 F.2d 853 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
80. At the beginning of 1965, normalization of accelerated depreciation benefits had
been adopted for ratemaking in 23 jurisdictions and flow-through in 16. What Others
Think, 75 PuB. UTIL. FoRT. 62, 64 (Jan. 21, 1965). By 1970 the score was 22 normalization
to 18 flow.through. What Others Think, 85 PUB. UTm. FoRT. 48, 49 (March 12, 1970). At
present almost all jurisdictions have allowed normalization on post 1969 property. Annual
Report on Utility and Carrier Regulation of the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners 505 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NARUC Report]. The 1969 Amendment
has caused the regulators to switch to normalization where required. 90 PUB. UTIL. FORT.
50 (Sept. 13, 1972). See cases cited note 157 infra. However, many jurisdictions have not
altered their practice of requiring flow-through on pre-1970 property or post-1969 non-
expansion property of a type on which flow-through was previously required. See note
161 infra. According to an Arthur Andersen & Co. survey for the Federal Energy Admin-
istration there were still eight such jurisdictions flowing through accelerated depreciation
benefits as of early 1977. Study of the Treatment of Construction Work in Progress and
Tax-Timing Differences: For Ratemaking Purpose iri the Electric Utility Industry,
Arthur Andersen & Co., 46 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Andersen Co. study].
-The NARUC report showed only four such jurisdictions as of 1976. NARUC Report
505 (note that the Virgin Islands are not included in the Andersen Co. study).
81. The FPC in some cases had allowed a 1.5% return on the amount in the reserve.
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To the extent that a tax benefit is denied on the basis of state
ratemaking determinations, section 167(l) arguably imposes an
unconstitutional condition on the exercise of state regulatory au-
thority." Utilities are unlikely to challenge this legislation. State
regulatory commissions or consumer intervenors in rate cases who
are in a position to challenge the law might appear to be asking
the agency or court to see that Congress is required to allow
accelerated depreciation to utilities. Actually, however, they
could demand only that if Congress allows accelerated deprecia-
tion to public utilities, it be allowed to those flowing through the
benefit.
Several attempts have been made to avoid section 167(l).
The Maine Public Utilities Commission held that normalization
was achieved by simply allowing normalization on the company
books of account while setting rates on a flow-through basis. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, however, held this to be an
abuse of discretion because the conclusion that the Internal Reve-
nue Code could be interpreted this way was itself arbitrary, and
because it placed the company in danger of losing the tax bene-
fits, also an arbitrary act.u The court was no doubt correct in
these conclusions. While a ruling that it would be better to lose
the tax benefit may have been within the commission's discre-
tion, the benefit clearly could not be retained under this method
if section 167(l) is valid.
The California Public Utilities Commission, after making
strenuous efforts to get around section 167(l), seemed ready to
give up in the face of strong Treasury Regulations,8 but the Su-
Note 53 supra. At the time it abandoned normalization it also ruled that no return should
be allowed on the accumulated deferred tax reserves. Alabama-Tennessee Nat. Gas Co.,
53 Pus. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 390 (F.P.C. 1969), aff'd 359 F.2d 318 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 249 (1966). In later cases, under normalization, the. FPC has allowed no return
at all. E.g., Transwestern Pipeline Co., 90 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 50, 62 (F.P.C. 1971).
Accord, Sierra Pacific Power Co., 10 Pun. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 461, 463 (Nev. P.S.C. 1975);
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 11 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 297, 300 (Mass. D.P.U. 1975);
Nashville Gas Co., 11 Pus. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 442, 447 (Tenn. P.S.C. 1975). Contra,
Kansas Power & Light Co., 72 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 450, 460 (Kan. St. Corp. Comm'n
1968) (allowing a return of 1.54% on part of capital represented by deferred tax reserve).
See also Treas. Reg. § 1-167(l)-1h(6)(i) (1971), which recognizes the legitimacy of
excluding the amount of the deferred tax reserve from the rate base.
82. See Part V. B. infra.
83. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 399 A.2d 8, 24 (Me. 1978),
revs'g in part New England Tel. & Tel. Co., F.C. #2213 and U. 3178 (Me. P.U.C., decided
June 10, 1977). The commission reasoned that § 167(l) merely required the company,
not the commission, to normalize. Id. at 53.
84. Among others, Treas. Reg. § 1-167(l)-1(h)(6)(i) (1971) defines "normalization"
19791
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preme Court of California forced it to reconsider all possible alter-
natives. The court suggested that section 167(l), at least as inter-
preted by the Treasury Department, might infringe on the power
reserved to the states under the tenth amendment, 5 that an
automatic adjustment clause reducing rate base to take account
of the investment capital available as a result of the deferred tax
might be permissible, 86 and that the rate of return itself might be
adjusted downward to reflect the availability of such capital.
The California Commission, reconstituted after the transi-
tion from Governor Reagan to Governor Brown, came up with an
approach that skirted the issue by lowering revenue needs based
on the use of an "average annual adjustment" to the deferred tax
reserve. The commission used an average of the estimated addi-
tion to the tax reserve for each of the three succeeding years to
make annual adjustments to the test year rate base and indirectly
to the tax expense." It allowed normalization in compliance with
section 167(l), but reduced revenue by recognizing heavy antici-
pated increases in deferred taxes, which annually decrease the
rate base, thereby decreasing the revenue requirement (as a mul-
tiple of the rate base) and the income tax payable on such de-
creased revenue.8 9
The Internal Revenue Service has issued an advisory letter
ruling that the average annual adjustment method is not a proper
normalization method and will result in the loss of eligibility for
accelerated depreciation."0 Treasury Regulations require that the
so as to exclude any situation where an amount in excess of the deferred tax reserve is
excluded from rate base.
85. City of Los Angeles v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 15 Cal. 3d 680, 690 n.20, 542 P.2d
1371, 1377 n.20, 125 Cal. Rptr. 779, 785 n.20 (1975).
86. 15 Cal. 3d at 704, 542 P.2d at 1387, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
87. 15 Cal. 3d at 704 n.42, 542 P.2d at 1387 n.42, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 795 n.42.
88. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 87838 (Cal. P.U.C. Sept. 13, 1977). The case consoli-
dated a number of proceedings involving Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co. as well as General Tel.
and Tel. It is complicated by the fact that the utilities involved had previously had
reductions in cost of service due to "imputed" flow-through, raising the question whether,
after § 167(t) the commission could continue to impute the tax benefits to the company
because it exercised poor management judgment in failing to elect to take accelerated
depreciation with flow-through rate treatment when it had had the opportunity to do so
(before 1970). See County of San Francisco v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 6 Cal. 3d 119, 490
P.2d 798, 98 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1971) (holding commission erred in not considering this
option). The formula used by the commission, however, avoids this problem for the future
as it permits normalization of taxes for both post-1969 and pre-1970 property.
89. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 87838, at 23 (Cal. P.U.C. Sept. 13, 1977).
90. Letter from Geoffrey J. Taylor, Chief, Engineering and Valuation Branch, IRS,
to Robert Dalenberg, Vice-President & General Counsel, Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Index
No. 0167.23-00, 17, June 8, 1978.
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deferred tax reserve and deferred tax expense be estimated for the
same year." The California Commission ruled that this require-
ment had been met,92 but the IRS apparently disagrees.13 On the
surface, the tax reserve and the tax expense are estimated for the
same year, but they are arguably not estimated by the same
method for each year. The IRS letter is not a model of clarity, but
it does seem to identify as grounds for objection to the plan its
use of the adjustment method to revise the deferred tax reserve
while "all related factors were frozen at the estimated level."
94
This type of objection may be made from a ratemaking stand-
point to any kind of an adjustment clause, but it is unusual for
the IRS to question ratemaking in this manner. The question
presented to a commission or to a reviewing court by an adjust-
ment clause is whether it is justified because it accurately reflects
identifiable and isolated changes relating to an abnormal situa-
tion or whether it is not justified because it passes on an increase
or decrease improperly based on one factor alone without taking
into account related variations in other parts of the structure. 5
On such a standard the California adjustment clause is sus-
pect because it adjusts for the increased tax reserve but not for
the accompanying anticipated increased income due to increased
normalized taxes. A simple tax adjustment clause that makes an
annual adjustment solely on the basis of lower taxes would be
more acceptable in ratemaking. Depending only on the amount
of tax benefit granted by the government, such a clause would
compare favorably to the fuel adjustment clause, which occasion-
ally has been upheld. Decisions on fuel use are ultimately con-
91. Treas. Reg. 1.167(/)-(1)(h)(6) (1971).
92. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 87838, at 27 (Cal. P.U.C. Sept. 13, 1977).
93. Letter from Geoffrey Taylor, note 90 supra at 5, 14.
94. Id. at 14.
95. Utility companies have, of course, not opposed the use of adjustment clauses
which tend to incorporate increases in expenses sooner than would be true under normal
test year rate proceedings. The courts have sometimes upheld adjustment clauses pertain-
ing to the cost of fuel. See City of Norfolk v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 197 Va. 505,
90 S.E.2d 140 (1955); City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 13 Ill. 2d 607, 150
N.E.2d 776 (1958); United Gas Corp. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 240 Miss. 405,
127 So. 2d 404 (1961); City of Akron v. Public Util. Comm'n, 5 Ohio 2d 237, 215 N.E.2d
366 (1966); Public Serv. Co. of N.H. v. New Hampshire, 113 N.H. 497, 311 A.2d 513 (1973);
Maestas v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 85 N.M. 571, 514 P.2d 847 (1973); State ex
reL Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 327, 230 S.E.2d 651 (1976). Contra, State ex
rel. Utility Consumers Council of Missouri v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 60848 (Mo. Sup.
Ct. en banc, June 29, 1979).
The utility companies are now in the position of opposing such a clause because it
passes on a decrease rather than an increase in collectible charges. They are fortunate to
have the IRS doing the objecting for them. See note 90 supra.
96. See cases cited in note 95 supra. But cf. Pennsylvania Pub. Utils. Comm'n v.
1979]
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nected to decisions on which plant to use, whether to purchase
power rather than generate, and what type of plant to build. All
these factors are more related to the-total rate structure than the
amount of taxes.
Moreover, use of such an annual tax adjustment clause
would be bolstered by many commission rulings that the actual
tax to be used for setting rates is not the test year tax figure, but
a figure adjusted to take account of known changes or changes
that can be predicted or estimated with reasonable certainty.
Among these are increases or decreases in revenue that will result
from a new rate order, changes in the tax code, adjustments to
be made as a result of the filing of consolidated returns, and net
operating losses available to carry forward.97 The Supreme Court
has held rates that ignore the most recent data in favor of predic-
tion based on older data to be confiscatory.98
Although such a complete tax adjustment formula might
pass ratemaking review, it would also directly challenge section
167(l). The formula actually adopted by the California Commis-
sion seems to comply with the language of the Code-and the
Treasury Regulations despite its theoretical weaknesses. The IRS
may simply be taking the position that any ratemaking method
that lowers allowed revenue requirements is unlawful if the IRS
perceives it as depriving the company shareholders of the tax
benefits. This approach gives the IRS broad powers and duties in
setting rates for intrastate sales of electricity. 9 Congress may
have intended to give the IRS this broad power to deny deducti-
bility because of the indirect effects of the ratemaking process on
total tax liability, but this conclusion is doubtful.
The California Supreme Court, although advised of the IRS
ruling, has declined to review the matter any further.110 Certiorari
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 91 PuB. U. RFP. 3d (PUR) 321, 361 (Pa. P.U.C. 1971) denying the
company use of an estimated three year adjustment method for computing normalized
taxes because it failed to take into account related benefits based on increased plant
capacity.
97. See notes 142, 145 and 146, and accompanying text infra.
98. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 79 (1935). The California
utilities relied heavily on this case in arguing for use of test year data only, but the
precedent can be taken the other way since the estimates in Pacific Tel. & Tel. are to be
based on growth figures in the most recent years. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 87838 at 36
(Cal. P.U.C. Sept. 13, 1977).
99. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 87838 (Cal. P.U.C. Sept. 13, 1977) highlights Surrey's
warning against the use of tax subsidies because they require the tax authorities to admin-
ister areas beyond their field of expertise. See note 26 supra.
100. Review Denied. Doc. Nos. 23746 and 23743 (Cal. S. Ct. July 13, 1978).
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has been denied by the Supreme Court.10' Judicial resolution of
these issues is now problematic.' 2 The clash between the IRS and
the California Public Utilities Commission has resulted, so far, in
the approval of questionable ratemaking by the court and com-
mission on one side, and the undesirable injection of the IRS into
state ratemaking decisions on the other. Congresi would do well
to look at proposals to replace the income tax on utilities with
either a tax on gross receipts or on usage.' 03
C. Tax Benefits Derived From Reduced Useful Life in
Calculating Depreciation for Tax Purposes
Before considering further the policies which support nor-
malization, the discussion will turn briefly to a second form of
depreciation-related tax benefit available under the Internal Rev-
enue Code. Taxpayers, including utilities, are allowed to group
different kinds of assets in large classes for depreciation purposes
and to assign to these assets a much shorter tax life than that
generally used for ratemaking depreciation.' 4 For instance, a nu-
clear electric generating plant which for ratemaking purposes
may be given a useful life of thirty years' 5 has under IRS regula-
tions an asset guideline period of twenty years, an upper limit of
101. Petitions for cert. filed, Nos. 78-606 and 78-607 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Oct. 1978), 47
L.W. 3278.
102. The companies have filed suit to enjoin the enforcement of the commission
order. Preliminary injunction was denied. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. California Pub.
Utils. Comm'n, General Tel. & Tel. Co. v. California Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Nos. 79-1024
RMT and 79-1025 RMT (C.D. Cal., Mar. 30, 1979); Notice of Intent to Appeal filed, Nos.
79-3150 and 79-3151 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 1979). The tax consequences may be reviewed in
later proceedings in the tax court or by district court suit for refund of taxes after the
benefit has been denied by the IRS. Since the utility companies have been pushing for
normalization, such tax litigation would amount to a friendly suit.
103. See note 49 supra. The California Commission itself made this recommendation.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 87838, 23 (Cal. P.U.C. Sept. 13, 1977).
104. I.R.C. § 167(m), adopting the "asset depreciation range," was enacted in 1971.
In 1962 the Treasury had begun to allow the grouping of diverse assets according to the
"guideline" system, which included the opportunity to shorten, based on a reserve ratio
test, the depreciable life of assets within the class. Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 C.B. 418. The
benefits were made available to electric and gas companies by Rev. Proc. 64-21, 1964-1
C.B. 685 and 1965-1 C.B. 759, easing the reserve ratio test so that utilities might benefit.
The new "class life" system adopts many of the old guideline classes but abandons the
reserve ratio test in favor of an asset depreciation range. The asset depreciation range
allows a period 20% longer or shorter than the basic guideline period but requires an
election to be made initially without the opportunity for later revision available under the
older method.
105. Northern States Power Co., 11 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 385, 394 (Minn. P.S.C.
1975).
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twenty-four years, and a lower limit of sixteen years.' 6 This re-
sults in a tax depreciable life of approximately one-half the useful
life allowed for regulatory purposes. Studies have shown the tax
lives under these code provisions are nineteen to thirty-six per-
cent too short, and thirty-five to forty-four percent too short with
depreciable real property improvements."7
Although nothing in the Internal Revenue Code specifically
requires normalization of these benefits,' 8 the Treasury Regula-
tions state that accelerated depreciation will be denied if a utility
company uses a useful life less than the applicable asset guideline
period."0 9 The Treasury apparently believes that use of a longer
period might unlawfully counterbalance the effects of normaliza-
tion.
By not requiring the shortest life, but only the use of its
median guideline period, the Treasury Department has taken an
intermediate position on the ratemaking effects of the asset de-
preciation range itself, although, of course, even the median pe-
riod is shorter than that usually allowed for ratemaking. That the
Treasury Department believed itself required to take a position
at all, however, illustrates the problem that once Congress inter-
feres, even slightly, with state ratemaking procedures, the IRS
and the courts may become involved with many other aspects of
the process that might have indirect effects contrary to the con-
gressionally mandated policy. Thus, if a commission lowers the
rate of return, denies construction work in progress, or in any way,
related or not related to taxes, lowers the revenue requirement,
this arguably allows, indirectly but unlawfully, the flow-through
of a tax benefit such as accelerated depreciation.
Since the Treasury Regulation requires normalization of only
the benefits of the shorter period allowed by the asset guideline
period itself and not the additional twenty percent, some discre-
106. See Tress. Reg. 1.167(a)-l1 (1971). Rev. Proc. 74-50, 1974-2 C.B. 506.
107. Beidleman, Economic Depreciation in a Capital Goods Industry, 29 NAT. TAx
J. 379, 386 (1976); Coen, Investment Behavior, The Measurement of Depreciation and Tax
Policy, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 59, 69-70 (1975); Taubman and Rasche, Economic and Tax
Depreciation of Office Buildings, 22 NAT. TAX J. 334, 342 (1969). For a summary of these
studies see Lischer, Depreciation Policy, Whither Thou Goest, 32 S.W.L.J. 545, 592-93 &
nn.319-25. Lischer recommends the repeal of asset depreciation range along with repeal
of accelerated depreciation for real property improvements. Id. at 593, 602-03. Several bills
have been introduced in Congress to repeal asset depreciation range. Id. at 602-03 & n.386.
108. I.R.C. § 167(l) addresses only the method of depreciation in terms of the more
rapid methods allowable under § 167(b)(2)-(4).
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(b)(6). The company is not required to use the shortest
life, but is forbidden to use a period longer than the IRS standard guideline period.
[Vol. 30
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tion still remains in the regulatory commissions. On the whole,
the commissions seem slightly more resistant to normalization in
this area. The 1976 National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners (NARUC) report shows six states using the actual
tax rule for rates with respect to guideline depreciation and seven
using the actual tax rule for asset depreciation range. ' The same
report, however, shows that twenty-seven states either require or
permit normalization of guideline depreciation benefits and
twenty-nine either require or permit normalization of asset depre-
ciation range benefits."' The Federal Power Commission required
normalization of these tax benefits as part of General Order 530.112
The statistics cited are not too helpful, as there is some question
on the degree of normalization allowed or required, and the
Treasury Regulations have not received much discussion. Never-
theless, a significant number of jurisdictions have now either re-
quired or allowed normalization of these benefits, despite an ear-
lier tendency to require flow-through"1 or even to impute flow-
through of these benefits to companies which had not used
them."1 4 At least one state has acknowledged the Treasury Regu-
lations as the primary reason for allowing normalization of these
benefits."'
Without trying to exhaust every possible tax benefit, one
other form of accelerated depreciation should be noted; IRC sec-
tion 169 allows for a five-year amortization of nonprofit certified
pollution control facilities in lieu of regular depreciation. The
Treasury Regulations do not require normalization of these bene-
fits.
110. NARUC Report, supra note 80.
111. Id. A number of states are listed as undecided.
112. See note 167 and accompanying text infra.
113. E.g., Consideration of the Normalization Method of Accounting for Certain Tax
Deferrals, Doc. No. 11641 (Conn. P.U.C., Oct. 14, 1975); Pennsylvania Pub. Utils.
Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 96 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 113, 137-38 (Pa. P.U.C.
1972); Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 7 PUB. U. REP.
3d (PUR) 470, 487 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n 1974).
114. Consolidated Ed. Co. of N.Y., Inc., 85 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 276, 292
(N.Y.P.S.C. 1970); United Fuel Gas Co., 46 PUB. U. RaP. 3d (PUR) 118, 129 (W. Va.
P.S.C. 1962). But see Consolidated Ed. of N.Y., Inc., 98 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 455, 466
(N.Y.P.S.C. 1973), which allowed normalization of the asset depreciation range benefits
in consideration of "the overall viability of the company" after publication of the final
Treasury Regulations.
115. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 3 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 1, 14-15 (Mich. P.S.C. 1973)
(ordering normalization despite the Mich. Attorney General's argument that not even the
IRS could force it on the commission).
1979]
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D. Regulatory Policy Relating to Normalization of Tax
Depreciation Benefits
Although section 167(l) has furnished the main impetus for
acceptance of normalization, normalization was sometimes al-
lowed even before the 1969 amendment. A number of arguments
have been raised. The most common argument is that Congress,
by increasing the depreciation deduction in early years, merely
deferred the tax on current income; thus, current ratepayers
should pay the amount of the tax which the company then puts
into a deferred tax reserve account to be kept until a later time
when the tax is actually collected."'
This argument provoked the counter argument that the taxes
are not really deferred at all, but are rather saved, because'as long
as a company continues building new plants there will be new
front-end accelerated depreciation to take the place of that used
on the older plant moving into the bottom end of the accelerated
depreciation cycle. In Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co., the
FPC simply reversed its position when confronted with factual
evidence that the "turning point" did not seem to be in sight."7
More elaborate mathematical models demonstrate that so long as
a utility company continues to grow or remains stable in its total
yearly sales, and replaces old plants on a cyclical basis, the
amount of tax deferral will not decrease.118
116. This theory was set forth by the FPC in the leading case approving normaliza-
tion, Amere Gas Utils., 15 PUB. U. BEP. 3d (PUR) 339 (F.P.C. 1956), approving normaliza-
tion accounting on the basis of Congressional intent to create a .deferral rather than a
reduction, although relying also on previous allowance of normalization of accelerated
amortization under former I.R.C. § 169, repealed "'76 Tax Reform Act," Pub. L. No. 94-
455, tit. XIX § 1951(b)(4)(A), 90 Stat. 1837 (1976). See also Panhardle E. Pipe Line Co.,
3 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 396 (F.P.C. 1954) rev'd on other grounds, but on this point aff'd
sub nom, Detroit v. Federal Power Comm'n, 230 F.2d 810, 821-22 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956); El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 22 F.P.C. 260, 267 (1959), aff'd 281
F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1960) (allowing normalization for ratemaking purposes on same
grounds).
117. Alabama-Tennessee Nat. Gas Co., 31 F.P.C. 208, 215-17 (F.P.C. 1964), aff'd sub
nom. Alabama-Tennessee Nat. Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 359 F.2d 318 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 847 (holding normalization "premature" until such time as
a company proved that higher tax payments would result in the reasonably foreseeable
future). The Alabama-Tennessee decision was criticized even before the enactment of §
167(l) as being contrary to the congressional policy of stimulating production by making
funds available to producers. Note, Liberalized Depreciation: About Face by the FPC, 50
VA. L. REv. 298, 335 (1964).
118. INsTrrTrE OF PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING, UNIV. OF CHICAGO, ACCELERATED DEPRE-
CIATION AND DEFERRED TAxas: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FLUCTUATING ASSET EXPENDITURES,
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING: SELECTED STUDIES 93 (1967); see Livingstone,
Accelerated Depreciation, Cyclical Asset Expenditures and Deferred Taxes, 5 J. OF Ac-
COUNTING RESEARCH, 77, 77-78 (1967); Livingstone, Accelerated Depreciation, Tax Alloca.
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This argument for flow-through treatment is strengthened by
the observation that if a utility company should not continue to
grow or to at least remain stable in size, present conditions of
heavy plant investment and high interest long-term debt make
it very likely that the company would have no future taxable
income against which to use up the deferred tax reserve, Since
utilities are regulated, however, the regulatory authorities would
have a duty to set rates providing an opportunity to earn profit
even in lean years.
The argument that current "deferred" tax benefits are a per-
manent savings may well hold true for deferrals made continu-
ously over a stable period of moderate growth and replacement
of plant. The argument might not hold true indefinitely, however,
during a long period of great plant growth such as we are pres-
ently experiencing if that growth tapers down in later years. After
a certain point of growth is reached, any future accelerated depre-
ciation attached to new equipment might well be depleted in
maintaining the level of deferred tax reserve accumulated in the
early years and would not be available for maintaining benefits
generated during the later part of the building period. Calculat-
ing when this point will be reached presents a formidable task.
The Federal Power Commission made "findings" that the
tax benefits were a "deferral" or a "true tax savings" according
to whatever result it reached at a particular time."' This debate
turned the question into a factual issue ' concerning whether the
deferred taxes would ever become real taxes, thus drawing atten-
tion away from the underlying question of ratemaking policy.
Even if the taxes are considered deferred rather than saved, how-
ever, the period of deferral is going to be so long that the distinc-
tion may not be particularly relevant to ratemaking.
Assuming arguendo that the taxes are deferred, a basic ques-
tion arises concerning whether it is proper ratemaking to charge
deferred taxes to the current ratepayers or to the ratepayers in
later years after the "crossover point" is reached. Although such
questions can be easily, if not properly, ignored if the time differ-
ential is short on the assumption that the main body of ratepayers
does not change much from year to year and it is simply a ques-
tion and Cyclical Asset Expenditures of Large Manufacturing Companies, 7 J. OF Ac-
COUNTING REsEAR cH 245 (1969).
119. See notes 116 and 117 supra.
120. Amere Gas Util. Co., 15 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 339,340 (F.P.C. 1956) (summary
of expert testimony on the question).
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tion of when the ratepayer will pay the tax,' when it became
apparent that billions of dollars were going into reserves for an
indefinite period to pay the taxes which might come due twenty
or thirty years later, if ever, the question whether the ratepayers
of today or tomorrow should properly be charged took on added
significance for many commissions. Regulatory agencies have jus-
tified flow-through on the theory that it is unfair to charge today's
ratepayers for tomorrow's costs."2 Others have attempted to jus-
tify normalization on the theory that it is unfair to charge to-
morrow's ratepayers for today's costs.12 At least one agency has
said it is unfair either way.
124
In considering this question, the ratemaking problem has
become interwoven with the accounting question. Normalization,
however, can not be justified under accounting theory nor under
sound ratemaking principles. The accounting community is itself
somewhat divided on the treatment of tax benefits. In general,
accountants believe that to accurately report income, costs must
be matched with revenues. Revenue is ordinarily measured over
a period of time. Expenses or losses are related to the revenues
in the period the revenue is recognized if the expense can be
directly associated with a particular item of revenue, as for exam-
ple with the production costs of an item sold. If an expense cannot
be associated directly with a specific revenue item, it is generally
charged to the period in which it was incurred. 5
Income taxes are not usually associated with specific revenue
items. Such taxes are simply mandatory contributions to the cost
of government.' Some accountants even view income taxes as a
distribution of income, rather than an expense; however, income
121. By this reasoning, the main financial consideration is simply who is to pay for
the use of the money during the time between collection by the utility and payment to
the government.
122. Lea City Gas Co., 10 Pun. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 279, 289 (N. Mex. P.S.C. 1955).
123. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 20 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 253, 259 (Ariz. Corp. Comm'n
1977).
124. Maine Pub. Serv. Co., 12 Pun. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 349, 351 (Me. P.S.C. 1956).
See also E. BIGHAM & J. PAPPAS, note 47 supra, at 215, demonstrating that the effect of
normalization on total rates is dependent on the length of the depreciation period and the
growth rate during this time. Only in a situation of no growth or of decreasing growth does
flow-through result in higher rates in later years, which will significantly offset lower rates
in earlier years. Id. at 87.
125. G. THOMPSON, supra note 35; S. DAvDSON, J. SCHINDLER & R. WEIL, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF AccOUNL No 188-90 (5th ed. 1975).
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taxes are usually reported as expenses primarily because financial
reporting itself is directed to the existing or potential stockholder,
to whom corporate income taxes are at least indirectly an ex-
pense. ,2r
The accounting profession, after much debate and study, 2
adopted a position in favor of normalization.1 29 This position
applies to financial reporting of a variety of transactions in which
income tax recognition occurs in a different period than normal
financial recognition.'30 The Accounting Principles Board (APB)
recommends the "deferred" method, under which effects of tax
transactions that reduce or increase current taxes are deferred
until later periods when accounting recognition of a related trans-
action occurs.' 3'
Since a nonregulated business may receive a considerable
boost in earnings from the use of accelerated depreciation for tax
purposes, there can be little quarrel with the principle that per-
sons reading the financial statement should be warned that fu-
ture tax liability may be higher to balance the present tax benefit.
Although a footnote to the financial statement might be consid-
ered sufficient,' 2 it has been deemed appropriate to go further
and show the deferred tax as a current expense. In theory, this
better informs an investor who wishes to easily compare state-
ments of a company that has not currently added plant and
equipment and has no tax benefit with one which has.' 3' The
127..S. DAVIDSON, J. SCHNDLER & R. WEiL, note 125 supra at 192-93.
128. H. Black, Interperiod Allocating of Corporate Income Taxes, Accounting Re-
search Study No. 9, AM. INST. OF CERT. PuB. Accrs., 12-61 (1966). This study sets forth
and evaluates several different methods of handling accounting items where the tax recog-
nition of an item does not occur in the same period as the period recognized for accounting
purposes.
129. Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board, 11 AM. INST. OF CERT. AccrS.
(1967). APB opinions carry considerable weight within the profession, and any material
departure therefrom in financial statements or auditors' reports is required to be disclosed.
130. Id. at 157.
131. Id. at 158, 162-63.
132. S. DAVIDSON, J. SCHINDLER & R. WElL, note 125 supra at 476, points out that a
deferred tax fails three of the four tests normally suggested for defining a liability (contrac-
tual obligation, certainty of amount, and certainty of date due), and therefore recom-
mends including deferred taxes in the indeterminate taxes liability section of a balance
sheet since deferred taxes are not a liability.
133. Price Waterhouse & Co., in proposing a more flexible modification of Op. No.
11, suggests that although failure to account for deferred taxes might mislead a prospec-
tive buyer into thinking a security is worth more than it is, a seller might be induced to
sell too cheaply on the basis of inclusion of deferred taxes. This misvaluation could occur
in situations in which the actual payment of the tax may never come about. PPICE WATER-
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earnings of a public utility are not based on competition, but
rather on rates which include allowances for operating expenses
and taxes. The possibility of higher future taxes for a utility com-
pany is not tremendously significant because the commission
that sets rates will provide sufficient income to cover the tax
expense.
Traditionally, different accounting methods have been used
for setting utility rates than are used for financial reporting gener-
ally. Opinion No. 11 of the APB recognized that for ratemaking
purposes normalization may not apply, and that if flow-through
is used for ratemaking, the use of normalization in reporting the
income of the company might be more confusing than to simply
report on the same basis used for setting rates. '34
This brief examination of the accounting treatment again
highlights the problem of including regulated utilities under sec-
tion 167 at all. The increased deduction applies only if the tax-
payer company acquires new plant and equipment. Every com-
pany that makes such acquisitions receives the benefits. Nonre-
gulated companies simply get some extra dollars with which they
can do whatever they like. They might use this cash to pay divi-
dends, to create a cash reserve, or perhaps to pass the benefits on
to the consumers in lower prices. The latter choice is unlikely
unless the company sees a chance to increase long range profits.
In any event, the choice is made according to market conditions.
If the company is in a fiercely competitive sales situation it will
lower prices. This is analogous to flowing through the benefits.
Another company may raise its dividends and issue some new
securities, while a third might simply pay out the tax savings as
cash for a new plant, thus increasing the value of its capital for
the benefit of its stockholders. The point is that a nonregulated
firm does not make a choice between flow-through or normaliza-
tion because its prices are determined by market competition.
In theory, the supervision of utility companies by regulatory
commissions substitutes regulation for competition.13 To the ex-
HOUSE & Co., Is GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING FOR INCOME TAXES POSSIBLY MISLEADING
INVESToRS (July 1967).
134. Op. No. 11, note 129 supra at 156. Further Committee on Accounting Procedure
of AICPA, pts. 8-9 ACCOUNTNG RESEARCH BULLETIN 44 (July 1958) provides that a company
on flow-through rates need not report on the basis of normalization, but requires disclosure
of flow-through status. The Financial Accounting Standards Board appointed a new task
force in 1978 to investigate areas in which utility accounting differs from that employed
in other industries. Business Week, April 3, 1978 at 88.
135. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 33 at 93.
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tent that there is an-analogy to nonregulated firms, a commission
might sense that it should treat the utility as though it were in a
highly competitive situation and require flow-through in the form
of lower prices. Most commissions did this initially, and the result
was logical because the commissioners reasoned that under the
law they were obligated to provide a fair rate of return to each
company aside from normalization.
The concept of a "deferred tax" makes it easier for a regula-
tory commission to justify normalization, because it makes an
"expense" out of what is not an expense. The term "deferred
tax," however, is a misnomer even in accounting terms. In normal
accounting parlance, a deferred item of income or expense is an
item incurred currently that properly relates to a later year. A
deferred expense is normally an item paid currently, but relating
to future income producing transactions. For instance, a com-
pany pays an insurance premium for coverage over three years.
Two-thirds of the expense is deferred in the first year. Similarly,
if a company makes a tax payment in 1978 for 1979 taxes, a
deferred expense is created. Although the current revenue col-
lected to pay the future taxes may be called deferred revenue, 3 '
the name at best identifies the result of normalization; it does not
justify the practice.
A tax benefit is neither income nor expense. 137 With acceler-
ated depreciation, the tax expense does not occur currently, sim-
ply because Congress has said that the tax expense is to be de-
ferred. The current recognition of this possible future expense is,
if anything, an accrued expense. Ordinarily, however, an expense
is accrued when there is an actual expense related to the current
period but not charged until later. Accrued taxes are common-
place. A calendar year taxpayer on the accrual basis is taxed in
April of 1978 for income earned in 1977; this actual tax relates to
1977 operations and is therefore a tax accrued on 1977 income.
With noimalization the tax is not accrued at all, but is postponed
or forgiven until another year altogether. The "deferred tax" is
therefore not a tax at all, but merely a reference to possible future
taxes. The APB and those jurisdictions that have approved nor-
malization have confused deferral of the tax with deferral of the
payment of the tax. If Congress had imposed the tax on current
136. See E. Spnimz, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 89 (rev. ed. 1971).
137. Op. No. 11 recognized that the deferred tax is not an expense but a "deferred
credit." Opinions of the APB, supra note 129, at 163.
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income but allowed the companies to pay it in a later year, a
much stronger accounting argument for a deferred tax would
exist. But Congress has actually postponed the tax itself.
Furthermore, the notion of charging this possible future tax
to current ratepayers ignores the nature of taxes, which are
charged to the public for the currently payable costs of govern-
ment, including, of course, carrying costs of government debts.
The taxpayer does not have any choice but to pay them as a cost
of the continuing right to remain in business.13 In general, a
utility acts as a conduit for taxes, passing the tax of the govern-
ment on to the ratepayer. 3 With respect to local taxes, the utility
should not charge them as a general expense to all ratepayers, but
should pass them on directly to the ratepayers within the jurisdic-
tions collecting the tax."'
138. This description of the use of the taxing power as applied to utilities may be
more correct in theory than in practice. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 33, at 403-04, relying
on H. Simpson, Taxation of Public Service Companies, published in Materials for the
Study of Public Utility Economics 471-90 (H. Dorau ed. 1930) and H. GROvEs, FINANCING
GOVERNMENT (5th ed. 1958) traces utility company taxation through an initial period of
subsidization or favored treatment lasting to the middle or end of the nineteenth century,
followed by a short period of neutrality, ending with the great depression, and then
followed by a period of overtaxation, perhaps engendered by public perception of excess
profits arising out of "fair value" rate base and avoidance of regulation through holding
companies, and continued simply as a means to support burgeoning government expendi-
tures.
Viewed in this historical perspective, the current tax benefits granted utilities may
help to cut down an excessive tax burden. In fact, they have swung the pendulum back
the other way. See note 16 supra. However, normalization converts the defunct tax burden
into a rate burden.
139. FARRIS AND SAMPSON, PUBLIC UTILITIES: REGULATI6N, MANAGEMENT AND
OWNERSHIP, 106-07 (1973). See notes 142-45 infra for cases holding to the "actual tax" rule.
140. City of El Dorado v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 235 Ark. 812, 362 S.W.2d
680 (1963) (order roughly passing on municipal taxes on gas meters to customers within
each municipality, eliminated previous discrimination where customers in low or no tax
municipalities were forced to help pay tax in high tax municipalities); Florida Pub. Util.
Co., 11 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 437, 439 (Fla. P.S.C. 1975) (burden of local franchise fees
should be borne by those customers who benefit primarily from the city services funded
by the fees); Village of Maywood v. Illinois Comm. Comm'n, 23 Ill. 2d 447, 178 N.E.2d
345 (1961) (rates which do not impose burden of franchise tax on users in community
which collects the tax are discriminatory); City of Elmhurst v. Western United Gas and
Elec. Co., 363 Ill. 144, 1 N.E.2d 489 (1936); Consumers Power Co., 14 PUB. U. REP. NS
(PUR) 36, 41 (Mich. P.U.C. 1936) (charging local taxes as a general operating expense is
an unjust burden on customers outside the municipality); City of West Plains v. Missouri
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 310 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. 1958); City of Newport News v. Chesapeake
and Potomac Tel. Co., 198 Va. 645, 96 S.E.2d 145 (1957); Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 15
PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 246 (Wy. P.S.C. 1956) (treatment of local excise taxes as a general
expense to be paid pro rata by all customers is discriminatory). Accord, Treatment of
Franchise Fees for Ratemaking Purposes, 12 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 289 (Fla. P.S.C. 1975)
36
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This illustrates the general rule that taxes are simply passed
on to the ratepayers directly."' Commissions have differed on
whether the amount of taxes allowed in a rate proceeding should
be the amount computed by applying the legal tax rates in effect
or to be in effect during the period to projected taxable income,'
or whether the amount of taxes allowed should be limited to
actual taxes paid in a test year.' The principle that the taxes
should reflect the actual amount of tax costs seems to underlie
both methods, and the regulatory agencies seldom departed from
this principle prior to normalization.144 This rule of "actual taxes"
(approving similar treatment of local franchise fees even though they were not held to be
"taxes").
141. Galveston Elec. Co. v. City of Galveston, 258 U.S. 388, 399 (1922); Federal Power
Comm'n v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 386 U.S. 237, 240, 243 (1967) (approving calculation
of federal income tax at actual effective cost, even though this involved some use of loss
generated by nonregulated companies in lowering tax rate of regulated company, where a
consolidated return was filed and the nonregulated companies could not use up all the
tax losses). Section 409A of the Uniform System of Accounts, used by most regulatory
commissions, provides: "This account shall include the amount of state and federal taxes
on income properly accruable during the period covered by the income statement to meet
the actual liability for such taxes . . . ." 18 C.F.R., Pt. 101 § 409 (1977).
142. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 90 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 111, 120-21 (Conn. P.U.C.
1971) (company cannot recover higher tax expense that would have been charged had a
separate return been filed, but is limited to allocated portion of tax on a consolidated
basis); General Tel. Co. of Fla., 76 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 380 (Fla. P.S.C. 1968) (pro
forma adjustments made to company's book taxes); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 2 PUB.
U. REP. 4th (PUR) 312 (Neb. P.S.C. 1974) (adjustment for known increases in state
income tax occurring after test year); Rhode Island Consumer's Council v. Smith, 113 R.I.
384, 322 A.2d 17 (1974); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Utah Power & Light Co., 50 PuB. U. REp.
3d (PUR) (Utah P.S.C. 1943) (disallowing excess profits taxes not reported or paid);
Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of W. Va., 18 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 236, 243 (W. Va.
P.S.C. 1976). See also cases cited at note 268 infra.
143. Hawkeye State Tel. Co., 2 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 166, 177 (Iowa State Comm.
Comm'n 1973) (interest deduction attributable to construction work in progress is in-
cluded in computing allowable taxes); e.g., Diamond State Tel. Co., 149 A.2d 324 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 1959) (actual tax expense can't be adjusted downward by attributing higher debt
and interest charges to subsidiary, where parent corporation had much higher debt rate);
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 13 PuB. U. REp. 4th (PUR) 65 (Me. P.U.C. 1970) (taxes
should be on actual paid basis); General Tel. Co. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 7 PuB.
U. REP. 3d (PUR) 273, 280-82 (Tenn. P.S.C. 1974) (property taxes should be calculated
based on test year); Potomac Ed. Co. of W. Va., 13 Pun. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 391 (W. Va.
P.S.C. 1976) (property tax deduction computed on basis of taxes actually paid during test
year).
144. "An income tax allowable should not exceed the taxes actually paid or de-
monstrably required to be paid in the immediate future." 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 42 at
54, citing South Carolina Generating Co., 15 PuB. U. REp. 3d (PUR) 289, 303 (F.P.C. 1956).
But see Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 22 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 60, 82-83 (S.D.P.U.C.
1977) (current construction related ad valorem taxes should be capitalized along with
other construction costs rather than allowed as a current expense).
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has been generally accepted,"5 and occasionally it is stated that
any allowance for taxes exceeding the actual taxes payable results
in undue profits."'
The rule charging to ratepayers the actual current taxes best
comports with the theory of utility taxation. The ratepayer gets
no benefit or service from the utility for the dollars that he pays
to defray the utility's taxes. The only benefit that he receives is
that the government collecting the tax allows the utility to stay
in business and spends the taxes for what economists call social
goods. The ratepayers who receive these benefits should be as
nearly as possible the ratepayers who pay the taxes. Flow-through
is the only method which achieves this goal. Under flow-through,
the current ratepayers pay the current taxes. To the extent that
taxes are or may be greater in later years from accelerated depre-
ciation, the ratepayers in those later years who receive the bene-
fits from those taxes are properly charged for them.
Normalization reverses this, and requires the current rate-
payers to pay taxes for the benefit of the future ratepayers. Even
assuming that the benefit is a tax deferral rather than a tax
saving, normalization is not a proper way to collect the taxes.
Aside from the question of the beneficial use of the money in the
intervening years, normalization charges the wrong ratepayers
with the tax."' Courts or commissions that have arrived at the
opposite conclusion1" have overlooked the nature and purpose of
145. The leading case is Galveston Elec. Co. v. City of Galveston, 258 U.S. 388 (1922),
where Justice Brandeis stated in calculating whether a return is proper "it is necessary
to deduct from gross revenue the expenses and charges; and all taxes which would be
payable if a fair return were earned are appropriate deductions." Id. at 399. Accord,
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 173 Ohio St. 473, 184 N.E.2d 84
(1962) (denying normalization and limiting company to taxes "actually paid").
146. Hawkeye State Tel. Co., 2 Pun. U. RzP. 4th (PUR) 166, 176 (Iowa Comm.
Comm'n 1973) ("the ratepayer should be responsible only for the actual amount of taxes
payable and any hypothetical tax liability should not be include'f in operating expenses.
Obviously, a holding company is not entitled to extraneous profits resulting from charges
to its subsidiaries for tax expsnses in excess of the fair-share of actual consolidated tax
expenses. . ."); City of Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 182 Pa. Super.
Ct. 551, 580, 128 A.2d 372, 385 (1956) (denying normalization and stating: "a utility is
allowed to pass on to its customers only its proper expenses and allowances plus a legiti-
mate profit or return to the utility. A bonus or gratuity based upon hypothetical considera-
tions in addition to this is improper and not permissible.") (citations--mitted); United
Fuel Gas Co., 46 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 118, 128 (W. Va. P.S.C. 1962) (denying normaliza-
tion of accelerated depreciation tax benefits and stating: "We believe the utility's position
on this question is no more than fiction and that-an income tax expense should not be
allowed unless the tax is actually paid.").
147. See note 122 supra & note 199 infra.
148. See note 123 supra.
[Vol. 30
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taxes as a current charge to support current government in favor
of the abstract notion that taxes should be spread out evenly over
a period of time, regardless of when the government collects
them.
The flow-through of these tax benefits to ratepayers may
seem to deprive the Treasury of revenue without providing suffi-
cient incentive for plant expansion. The real reason for this lies
not in the use of flow-through accounting, but once again in the
absence of any compelling reason to provide utilities with this
incentive. Unlike nonregulated industries, utilities are required to
provide adequate service to all their customers and are guaran-
teed by the regulatory system a reasonable return on their invest-
ment for this service
14
Similarly, arguments for normalization based on accurate
financial reporting practices may be appropriate for nonregulated
industries that have elected to build new plants and thus have
received tax benefits that may conceal the possibility of higher
taxes in later years. These same arguments are not appropriate
to utility ratemaking because the law requires that the company
earn the same reasonable rate of return no matter what its future
taxes may be.
Some commissions have required normalization for utility
financial reporting, but not for rates; ' however, this distinction
is questionable. Although financial reporting may enable inves-
tors to compare a utility company with a nonregulated company,
the comparison is meaningless because the possible future taxes
are considerably more of a risk to the future earnings of nonregu-
lated companies. Such comparisons imply to the investor that a
utility should be as well prepared to handle future taxes out of
current earnings as a nonregulated company, thus discouraging
utility investors and leading to the demand for still higher current
rates of return from the regulators to the detriment of ratepayers.
Professor Bonbright favored normalization of accelerated
depreciation benefits in part because he believed that straight-
line depreciation generally resulted in an overly retarded allow-
ance for cost recoupment aside from tax considerations. 5' The
149. See notes 42 & 43 and accompanying text supra.
150. E.g., Florida Tel. Co., 74 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 377 (Fla. P.U.C. 1968) (allowing
normalization for rate setting but flow-through for accounting in order to increase the
company's reported earnings and improve its capital generating capabilities); New Eng-
land Tel. & Tel. Co., Nos. FC 2213; U 3178 (Me. P.U.C., filed June 10, 1977), reu'd, 390
A.2d 8 (Me. 1978).
151. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 33, at 221.
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argument is not a strong one. An electric plant is not like an
automobile, which loses a big chunk of its value right at the
beginning just because its resale value is reduced once it becomes
"used." Resale value is not a primary consideration in plant de-
preciation. Moreover, issues concerning depreciation of utility
assets have been thrashed out before regulatory commissions for
years and if any reasonable argument for more rapid depreciation
could be advanced, the companies would have brought it to the
attention of the commissions before it became an accepted tax
device. Recent studies show that for all industries, accelerated
depreciation is slightly more accurate than straight-line deprecia-
tion for equipment alone, but less accurate than straight-line
depreciation when applied to the depreciable real property im-
provements 5 ' that make up a large part of utility investment.
Bonbright's second reason for supporting normalization was
that the practice of using accelerated depreciation in itself re-
duces the value of the asset more rapidly by using up the tax
saving value in the early years.' This confuses the tax benefits
with proper depreciation concepts relating to wear and tear or
obsolescence. The "net of taxes" method of handling tax benefits
divides the cost of the asset into two parts-the tax benefit and
the remainder. The tax benefit is then depreciated on an acceler-
ated basis and the balance of the cost is depreciated on a straight-
line basis. The result is the same as normalization in terms of
rates, but the concept more honestly labels what is being done as
depreciation of a tax benefit. A tax benefit is difficult to accept
as a depreciable asset when there is no assurance that the future
tax structure and future taxable income will make that benefit
worth anything. Moreover, although a tax benefit is depleted, it
need not be replaced because of wear and tear or obsolescence.
The tax benefit would not seem to be the kind of asset that is
normally depreciable.
Finally, Bonbright stated that unless companies could nor-
malize, at least to the extent of collecting the deferred tax, they
would revert to straight-line depreciation and lose the tax benefit
altogether."4 He perceived this as harmful to consumers in the
152. Beidleman, supra note 107, at 389; Coen, supra note 107, at 72; Taubman and
Rasche, Subsidies, Tax Law and Real Estate Investment, in 3 JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., THE
ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL SUBSIY PROoRAMS, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 343, 343-44 (Comm. Print
1972).
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long run. If he had foreseen, however, that accelerated deprecia-
tion would become a permanent part of the code rather than a
temporary economic stimulus and that utility construction pro-
grams would result in billions of dollars of normalized taxes being
charged to consumers annually, the possible reversion to straight-
line depreciation might have seemed less alarming. Still, the ar-
gument that the ratepayers are better off even ff only the com-
pany receives the tax benefit has validity. At first glance, the
ratepayers apparently pay the same amount under normalization
as under straight-line depreciation with no tax benefits. If the
ratepayer has any preference, the money arguably should go to
the government, resulting in either increased government services
or lower taxes all around. Under normalization, however, the util-
ity company's rate of return will probably be less,'" lowering the
total rates below what they would be without the tax benefit.
The enactment of section 167(l) in 1969 induced most com-
missions to accept normalization of accelerated depreciation ben-
efits, at least for post-1969 expansion property, since the acceler-
ated depreciation option is lost if normalization is not allowed."'
In some instances, the regulators have openly acknowledged the
utilities' need for increased cash flow because of inflation and
heavy plant construction demands as the basis for allowing nor-
malization.'57 To the extent that Congress has succeeded in re-
quiring normalization, they have added to the cost of the tax
benefit borne by the general federal income taxpayers an equal
burden to be borne by the current ratepayers. This has under-
mined the entire ratemaking process by tempting the regulators
to allow a fictitious tax expense in addition to or in lieu of the
normal required rate of return.
It is not usually stated openly that the rate of return is low-
ered because of the additional cash flow to a utility from normali-
zation, because such a statement would invite the Internal Reve-
nue Service, probably with the assistance of the utility, to chal-
155. See note 165 infra.
156. E.g., Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 462 F.2d
853 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 411 U.S. 458 (1973); South Central Bell Tel.
Co., 83 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 317 (Ala. P.S.C. 1970); Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 3 PuB. U.
REP. 4th (PUR) 1, 15 (Mich. P.S.C. 1973); City of Akron v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 51 Ohio
St. 2d 27, 364 N.E.2d 869 (1977); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Ed.
Co., 96 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 113, 138 (Pa. P.U.C. 1972); Newport Gas Light Co., 85
PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 257, 262-63 (R.I.P.U.C. 1970).
157. E.g., Southern New England Tel. Co., 78 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 504 (1969).
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lenge the use of rapid depreciation."' A commission need not
make such damaging admissions in a period when rates of return
are increasing; all a commission need do in a particular rate pro-
ceeding is to allow an increase in the rate of return slightly lower
than it would have allowed without the availability of normalized
taxes.' Difficulties arise here because this makes it impossible
to calculate and evaluate the real rate of return; it ignores the
statutory requirements for rate of return, it deceives the public
into believing that a lower return is being granted than is actually
the case, and it conceals from current ratepayers that they are
paying money for taxes from which they will not derive any bene-
fits.
In summary, the simplest solution to the current problem
would be for Congress to exclude regulated industry from the
benefits of accelerated depreciation. Failing this, Congress could
158. See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
159. It has occasionally been suggested in the cases that the flow of cash caused by
normalization should result in a lower required rate of return on equity. E.g., El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 22 F.P.C. 260, 267 (1958), remanded, 281 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 912 (1960) (deferred taxes might lower company's cost of money and
allow a lower rate of return) (dictum); City of Los Angeles v. Public Util. Comm'n, 15
Cal. 3d 680, 704-05 n.42, 542 P.2d 1371, 1387-89 n.42,125 Cal. Rptr. 779, 795-96 n.42 (1975).
(dictum); Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 76 Pus. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 277,288,294 (Utah P.S.C.
1968) (refusing to impute accelerated depreciation to a straight-line company, but consid-
ering this is setting lower rate of return).
President Batinovich and Commissioner Sturgeon of the California Public Utilities
Commission in a recent article, Federal Taxes and Regulated Utilities: A Solution to the
Dilemma, printed at Hearings Before Comm. on Ways and Means, President's Tax Re-'
duction and Reform Proposals, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., part 4 of 9, p. 2039 (1978), recom-
mended the adoption of H.R. 8897, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); see note 49 supra. They
stated several times that commissioners in fact take account of "normalization" funds
available in performing their statutory duty to set a fair rate of return. Batinovich &
Sturgeon, supra at 2046, 2057. The point is also made in recent testimony of Dr. Charles
Cicchetti, Chairman of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission. Hearings Before
Comm. on Ways and Means, President's Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals, 95th
Cong., 2nd Sess. part 4 of 9, p. 1890 (1978). He stated that some regulators oppose
change in the tax laws precisely because they believe that the resulting higher rates of
return would be politically impossible. Id. at 1892. See also testimony of Chairman
Clement of the Tennessee Public Service Commission. Id. at 1894. Commissioner Stur-
geon of California pointed out the absurdity of the situation when he related that a rep-
resentative of A.T.T. stated that he was not overly anxious to reduce the corporate tax
to 44% because of reduction of the tax benefits. Id. at 1889-90.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence of this adjustment is contained in a study
prepared by one of the guiding forces behind normalization, Arthur Andersen & Co. On
the basis of a study prepared by Duff & Phelps, Inc., utility financial analysts, the Ander-
sen analysts conclude that the overall cost of capital to utilities is properly reduced from
'/4 to 1/2 a percentage point by use of full normalization in contrast to flow-through.
Andersen Co. Study, supra note 80, Part I.C. at 29, 64, 68, 72, 74. Although 1/2 a percent
does not seem like a great deal, it amounts to $10 million of pre-tax revenue annually on
a $1 billion rate base.
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repeal section 167(l) and allow complete flow-through. Politi-
cally, more hope may lie in the enactment of proposed legislation
replacing the income tax on utility companies with an excise
tax. " 0 In the meantime, a number of jurisdictions have continued
to flow through the tax savings on pre-1970 and post-1969 re-
placement property. 16' One commission has counterbalanced nor-
malization benefits with an automatic deferred tax annual ad-
justment clause. 6' Another possible device would be to use the
deferred tax reserve to eliminate the need for cash working capi-
tal. "'63 Probably the most common regulatory response is to allow
normalization and either openly or tacitly hold down the rate of
return.
]II. NORMALIZATION OF OTHER TAX DEDUCTIONS AND
COMPREHENSIVE INTERPERIOD INCOME TAX ALLOCATION
The simplest form of normalization is that related to items
expensed for tax purposes but amortized for ratemaking pur-
poses. No particular language in the tax code prescribes normali-
zation for these items, and they are not, as is the case with accel-
erated depreciation and investment tax credit, tied to any partic-
ular tax subsidy. The opportunity for normalization exists simply
because these items may be currently expensed for tax purposes
but not for ratemaking purposes; in any test year computation
there is a deductible tax expense for ratemaking purposes that
can either be flowed through to the ratepayer by reducing the
revenue requirement or collected from the ratepayer and a re-
serve established to educe revenues in future years.
Many of these current tax deductions relate to construction
160. See note 49 supra.
161. E.g., Mars Hill & Blaine Water Co., 19 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 380 (Me. P.U.C.
1977) (ordering flow-through to the extent that tax benefit will not be lost and placing
burden on company to show that tax benefit will be lost).
162. See notes 88-103 and accompanying text supra.
163. Many jurisdictions set off accrued taxes against any working capital require-
ment. Union Elec. Co., 81 PuB. U. RP. 3d (PUR) 265, 269 (Mo. P.S.C. 1969) (tax accruals
sufficient to provide working capital); Southern New England Tel. Co., 78 PuB. U. REP.
3d (PUR) 504, 514 (Conn. P.U.C. 1969) (disallowing working capital from rate base be-
cause of normal delay in paying of income taxes, collection of excise taxes, and advance
billing procedures available). By the same reasoning the deferred tax amount represents
funds that are available for use as working capital. An argument can be made that the
deferred tax reserve is already earmarked for construction work in progress. When normal-
ized taxes are allowed as a current expense, however, there is a regular incoming cash flow
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work in progress. Regulatory authorities often do not permit util-
ity companies to recover a return on property that is not yet used
in the production of service.1" Partially completed new plants are
therefore not included in the rate base until they go into actual
service. Similarly, expenses incurred for construction work in
progress are not allowed as current operating expenses, but must
be amortized as part of the cost of the plant over its useful life
after completion. Such expenses include many items, such as
wages paid for construction workers and equipment costs for
equipment used in construction, which have to be capitalized for
income tax purposes.' No problem is created by these items;
however, other construction costs can be deducted currently as a
tax expense even though the plant is not completed. These in-
clude state and local real and personal property taxes, current
employee pension contributions, sales and use taxes, and interest
paid on debt used to finance construction."' Similar items exist
which are not related to new construction, such as certain repairs
that can be expensed for tax purposes but must be amortized for
ratemaking purposes.
The Federal Power Commission took the lead in allowing
utility companies to normalize these tax benefits. FPC Order
530117 provides for comprehensive interperiod income tax alloca-
tion,' allowing normalization of all items if the tax is found to
164. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. tit. 35, § 52 (1964) (requiring fair return on "reasonable
value" of property used or required to be used in its service to the public); N.Y. [PuB.
SERV.] LAW § 66.16 (McKinney 1955) (rates based on "fair value of the property used and
useful in said service"). See note 6 supra (regarding the allowance or disallowance of
construction work in progress in the rate base).
165. In Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1973), the Supreme Court held
that depreciation expense on transportation equipment used for construction must, to the
extent the equipment was so used, be amortized over the life of the plant constructed
rather than over the life of the equipment. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) disallows a deduction for
amounts "paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements. . . ." Under I.R.C.
§ 161 the Court read this as an exception to I.R.C. § 167 and held that when amortization
was required by generally accepted accounting principles and made mandatory by the
state regulatory commission, the current depreciation expense, even though not a cash
expenditure, should be considered as "paid out" under § 263(a)(1). 418 U.S. at 16-19.
166. Although interest as compared to depreciation, see note 165 supra, is unques-
tionably "paid out," the Internal Revenue Code does not disallow the deduction of current
interest expense on funds borrowed for construction work in progress. If the Internal
Revenue Code treatment consistently required amortization of these items, the ratemak-
ing problem discussed here would disappear.
167. F.P.C. Order 530, 53 F.P.C. 2123 (1975).
168. The lengthy discussion in Order 530 (with all its revisions and related orders)
leaves one unsatisfied in part because the phrase "comprehensive interperiod income tax
allocation" is interpreted to include a number of different items. It is assumed without
[Vol. 30
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occur in a different period than when the income is deemed to be
earned, including accelerated depreciation and asset depreciation
range benefits.'69
In Order 530, the FPC gave four reasons for adopting normal-
ization. First, Congress had expressed its views favoring normali-
zation of liberalized depreciation benefits under section 167(/).1
Second, cash shortage was perceived in the gas and electric power
industries, creating difficulties in raising the capital necessary for
growth. Third, the FPC desired to increase cash flow and reduce
external financing requirements for these companies. Last, they
desired to increase the financial stability of the companies and
improve fixed charge coverages. 171 Under the terms of the original
order, normalization was to be allowed in ratemaking on a case-
by-case basis, dependent on a factual showing by the company
of a tax deferral rather than a true tax saving.7 2 Further, normali-
zation accounting would not be required in jurisdictions in which
normalization was not allowed for rates. 7
3
FPC Order 530A, entitled "Order Denying Applications for
Rehearing and Clarifying Prior Order,"'' 7  emphasized the need
for a factual showing of a tax deferral, 175 specifically stating
that the need f-or increased cash flow and better fixed charge
coverage, although relevant, would not justify normalization
without such a showing.Y7 6 Moreover, the FPC stated that "in
further discussion that the "later" tax relates to "earlier" earnings and that there is thus
involved a "timing difference." Once this assumption is made the rest of the discussion
seems superfluous. Yet, the soundness of the assumption as applied to each item is never
considered. The order specifically includes tax benefits associated with depreciation (in-
cluding class life asset depreciation range), accelerated amortization on certified defense
facilities (I.R.C. § 168), extraordinary property losses amortized for ratemaking purposes,
research and development expenditures when amortized, deferred gain or loss from sales
of utility plants, repair allowance, amortized regulatory commission expenses, capitalized
construction costs (including interest, pension costs, taxes), and deferred fuel costs. 53
F.P.C. at 2124-25.
169. The commission, prior to Order 530, had in some instances continued to require
flow-through on pre-1970 property and post-1969 replacement property when permitted
to do so by I.R.C. § 167(l). See note 77 supra. It has now opted for normalization in all
instances.
170. F.P.C. Order 530, 53 F.P.C. at 2126.
171. Id. at 2127.
172. Id. The order speaks of a "factual showing," but does not clearly define the issue
to be resolved.
173. Id.
174. F.P.C. Order No. 530A, 8 FED. POWER SERV. (M. BENDER) 5-224 (Jan. 19, 1976).
175. Id. at 5-227-28.
176. Id. See also El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 281 F.2d 567,
573 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 912 (1960) (holding that mineral depletion tax
1979]
45
Liberman: Normalized Taxes in Utility Rates: Giving Credits When None Are D
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
general, the proper place to consider issues such as the need for
increased cash flow, financial stability of the utility, fixed charge
coverages and other risks associated with a utility's operation is
in the area of setting a just and reasonable rate of return on
common equity .... "177
This disposed of three of the original arguments of Order 530,
but did not address the first argument based on congressional
preference for normalization. The FPC did well to abandon this
one, because the congressional preference for normalization of
accelerated depreciation might well imply a lack of preference for
normalization in the other areas in which Congress had said noth-
ing."' Moreover, the clear tax incentive motivations underlying
section 167(l) belie any notion that this is a normal accounting
procedure. Normalization of accelerated depreciation had been
advocated and adopted in most jurisdictions as an exception to
the usual rules, rather than an example thereof. Perhaps the
Commission at this point sensed its tenuous position, because it
proposed the argument that normalization prevents the shifting
of the tax burden to future consumers in return for "artificially
lower rates" today. This, of course, assumes that today's custom-
ers are the proper persons to pay for tomorrow's taxes.7 '
FPC Order 530B, an "Order Revising Prior Orders,"'' s rede-
fined the need for a specific factual showing supporting rormali-
zation in each rate proceeding to such an extent that it was pract-
ically eliminated.'' The Commission held out a straw to the con-
sumers by providing that normalization will not be permitted
when the difference between book and tax recognition is a
"permanent" difference,'81 but included in this category only
items such as municipal bond interest, political contributions,
and depletion allowances.'" The FPC thus reversed its previous
order requiring that a tax deferral rather than a tax saving be
benefits should be flowed through, although exhaustion of a wasting asset was a factor
required to be considered in setting a rate of return).
177. Order 530A, supra note 174, at 5-228 (emphasis added).
178. See Tress. Reg. § 1.167(L)-1(a)(1) (1974); H.R. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969); Pennsylvania- Elec. Co., 10 PUB. U. REp. 4th (PUR) 351, 353-54 (1975)
(disallowing normalization of items not affected by I.R.C. § 167(l)).
179. Order 530A, supra note 174, at 5-230-31; see note 124 and accompanying text,
supra.
180. F.P.C. Order No. 530B, 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M. BENDER) 5-187 (July 6, i976).
181. Id. at 5-194.
182. Id. at 5-189, 193.
183. Id. at 5-188.
748 [Vol. 30
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shown, but allowed normalization in any case in which there is a
so-called "timing" difference.'" The Commission removed the
factual issue of whether in a particular instance the deferrals
would amount to a long-term or permanent savings on the basis
of a theoretical conclusion that "if the tax effect of each year's
construction is spread equitably over the plant's life, the aggre-
gate result cannot but be equitable.""'
The Commission evidently still felt a lack of adequate theo-
retical underpinnings, for it again addressed the reasons for nor-
malization in Order 530B. This time it went to some length to
develop the position that the decision whether to use normaliza-
tion or flow-through does not involve a general issue of law, but
only a discretionary choice of accounting methods.' 6 It then rei-
terated as reasons for the general rule in favor of normalization
the need for cash flow, reduced external financing, increased fi-
nancial stability, and improved fixed charge coverage." 7 Aside
from the Commission's abandonment of this line of reasoning in
Order 530B, all of these factors are particularly well suited for
examination on a case-by-case basis; they have nothing to do
with accounting principles.
The question of which ratepayers should pay the tax is given
only perfunctory attention in Order 530B, but normalization is
justified on the basis that the tax should appropriately be spread
over all years.' This reasoning ignores the action of Congress in
assessing and collecting. taxes in a particular year and elevates
the Commission over Congress, allowing it to spread the economic
impact of taxes as it sees fit.
Finally, in its "Order Denying Rehearing of Order No.
530B," the FPC again discounted the financial stimulus motiva-
tion for normalization as embracing relatively "short term"
changes in the industry regulated and relied primarily on the
theory that normalization is "the proper and preferable method
for ratemaking and accounting purposes."' Thus, in the end the
FPC has eliminated all bases for the rule except the conclusion
that it is "good accounting." It made no real examination of
comprehensive interperiod tax allocation and its applications to
184. Id.
185. Id. at 5-192.
186. Id. at 5-190.
187. Id. at 5-191-92 (quoting Order 530A, note 174, supra).
188. Id. at 5-192.
189. F.P.C. Docket # R-424, R-446 (Sept. 3, 1976).
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discover if indeed it does correctly allocate expenses any better
than flow-through. Moreover, it sets aside normal ratemaking
considerations in favor of an arbitrary power to distribute ex-
penses evenly over the years.
The court of appeals recently reversed the FPC orders adopt-
ing comprehensive interperiod tax allocation. It held that the
orders neither assessed the consequences of the action for the
industry nor indicated "fully and carefully" their purposes. In
essence, the court found insufficient evidentiary and policy bases
for the order in the record, and therefore remanded it.'10
State commissions have been more cautious in adopting nor-
malization of tax benefits when not required to do so by the tax
codes. Some have rejected it altogether, and others have allowed
it for certain items.' 91 In at least one instance, the pressure
brought to bear on state regulatory practice by section 167(l) and
accelerated depreciation seems to have opened the door for fur-
ther normalization. 9 2
190. Public Systems v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Nos. 76-1609 & 76-1830,
slip op. at 13-18 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 1979).
191. Normalization rejected: Iowa Power and Light Co., 6 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR)
446, 453-56 (1974) (Iowa State Comm. Comm'n 1974) (actual tax expense rule requires
flow-through, distinguishing earlier case that by stipulation allowed normalization of
interest deduction for interest related to construction work in progress because company
had a serious cash flow problem); New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR)
130, 167 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Utils. 1970) (includes interest on capital costs of construc-
tion work in progress as a current tax deduction); Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 79 PUB. U.
REP. 3d (PUR) 375, 387-88 (Mich. Pub. Util. Comm. 1969) (exceptions to the rule of actual
taxes should be granted, if at all, only in rulemaking proceedings with public hearings);
Midstate Tel. Co., 10 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 88, 94 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1975); Montana-Dakota
Util. Co., 21 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 1, 12-14 (S.D.P.U.C. 1977).
Normalization allowed: Ala. Power Co., 97 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 371, 376 (Ala.
P.S.C. 1972) (allowing partial normalization of current deductions relating to construction
work in progress); Union Elec., Case No. ER-154 (Mo. P.S.C., filed Jan. 19,1978); Natural
Fuel Gas Distrib. Co., 17 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 138, 152 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1976) (deferring
tax benefits associated with unfinished construction); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n
v. Duquesne Light Co., 5 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 202, 241-42 (Pa. P.U.C. 1974) (deduction
related to interest on construction work in progress deferred). The Andersen Co. Study,
supra note 80, shows 23 states normalizing and 24 flowing-through the item of interest
related to construction, and with respect to other items shows 28 normalizing to 21
flowing-through. Id. at Part IV-47. The NARUC Report, supra, note 80, shows three
categories: costs of removal, repair allowance, and "all other," finding 6 jurisdictions
(excluding the Virgin Islands) requiring flow-through of each of the three categories and
10, 11, and 7 jurisdictions, respectively, requiring normalization of these three categories.
Id. at 505.
192. In Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ohio Pub. Util. Co., 173 Ohio St. 473, 184
N.E.2d 84 (1962), the court relied on the actual tax principle and required flow-through
of accelerated depreciation tax benefits. After the present I.R.C. § 167() was enacted in
1969, the Ohio Commission began allowing normalization in appropriate situations to
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The use of gimmicks or devices simply to improve a com-
pany's financial attractiveness as an investment makes a mock-
ery of the traditional ratemaking process. If a company needs a
higher rate of return to attract the necessary capital, that rate
should be allowed in a straightforward manner. The inclusion of
artificial expenses in the cost of services confuses the ratepayer
and investor alike.
93
An additional argument used to justify normalization of
these current tax deductions is that since for ratemaking purposes
the expense must be amortized over a future period, it follows
that the tax benefit associated with the expense should be
matched with the expense by amortizing it over the same pe-
riod.'94 This argument does not adequately take into considera-
tion ratemaking practices. Although the items in question may
not be chargeable directly to ratepayers as a cost of service until
future years, the current ratepayers are in a very important sense
paying for the expense presently. The regulatory duty to provide
regulated utility companies with a rate of return sufficient to
raise the capital necessary to provide the services demanded by
the public includes a duty to provide a sufficient return to attract
capital needed to build the necessary facilities to supply reason-
ably foreseeable increases in demand.'95
prevent the company from losing federal tax benefits, and the Ohio Supreme Court af-
firmed, reversing its earlier position against normalization. City of Akron v. Ohio Pub.
Util. Comm'n, 51 Ohio St. 2d 27, 364 N.E.2d 869 (1977). A statute was enacted permitting
normalization when necessary to preserve a tax benefit. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4909-
15(A)(4) (Page Supp. 1978). Following all this, the Ohio Commission has now allowed
comprehensive interperiod allocation at least for new plant additions. Dayton Power &
Light Co., 21 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 376, 388-91 (Ohio P.U.C. 1977); Dayton Power &
Light Co., 21 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 295, 300-03 (Ohio P.U.C. 1977).
193. Two commissions have openly relied on the need for cash flow as the sole reason
for allowing this normalization. One indicated that the ruling should not be considered
precedent on the issue. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 2 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 288, 294
(Iowa St. Comm. Comm'n 1973). The other allowed normalization of interest expense tax
deductions but required flow-through of other tax benefits associated with unfinished
construction. Kansas Power & Light Co., 20 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 55, 59-60 (Kan. St.
Corp. Comm'n 1977). Contra, Hawkeye State Tel. Co., 2 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 166 (Iowa
St. Comm. Comm'n 1973). On the distortion of rate of return caused by tax normalization,
see note 159 supra. The confusion and obfuscation of the true rate of return made neces-
sary by normalization recurred in recent testimony before the Ways and Means Commit-
tee. See Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Comm., note 159 supra, at 1889 (Cal.
Comm'r Sturgeon), 1894 (Tenn. Comm'r Clement), 1891 (Wisconsin Comm'r Cicchetti),
2035, (Cal. Comm'r Batinovich).
194. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Duquesne Light Co., 5 PUB. U. REP. 4th
(PUR) 202, 241-42 (Pa. P.U.C. 1974).
195. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603, 607 (1944);
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Although an item of new construction may not yet be part
of rate base or chargeable as an operating expense for rate pur-
poses, the company must still currently pay for that item. The
current ratepayers, by providing a sufficiently high rate of return,
have enabled the company to raise the money necessary to pay
for it. When the item becomes an allowable expense or, more
correctly, when it is added to the rate base and subsequently
depreciated, the future ratepayers will have to pay its replace-
ment cost, but it is the current ratepayers who have provided a
return sufficient to allow the company to acquire the new equip-
ment. A new plant will be fully depreciated over its useful life
starting with the date it becomes operational, but that deprecia-
tion expense will merely replace the capital needed to build it.
This capital is and must be raised before the plant begins func-
tioning, and it is during this period of capital raising that inves-
tors will be concerned with the rate of return. If demand lags so
that no new construction is necessary for a significant period of
time, it is almost certain that a lower rate of return will suffice
in the future since the company would be in a stronger financial
position. The need for costly new plants is largely what has
caused the demand for higher returns and higher rates on the part
of electric power companies, and the present ratepayers are al-
ready paying these higher rates."'
The Iowa State Commerce Commission, in In re Hawkeye
State Telephone Co., stated:
The Uniform System of Accounts classifies construction work in
progress as utility plant, and permits its costs to include cost of
capital during the lag until revenues are obtained. The company
reduces its income taxes for interest capitalized during con-
struction. This savings should be passed along to the ratepayer
the same year it is realized. The full amount of interest charged
to construction work in progress is included in rate base when
the construction projects are placed in service. If we were to fail
to recognize this tax saving now, the ratepayer would be penal-
ized.
The contention that the ratepayer does not bear a cost for
construction work in progress until the finished project goes into
service is specious. Even though unfinished construction work
in progress is not included in rate base, the capital costs are
Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 262 U.S.
679, 693 (1923). See also notes 42-43 supra.
196. See note 5 supra.
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included in determining the cost of capital. There is no require-
ment that ratepayers pay a return on any property not in serv-
ice. Nevertheless, the cost of capital used in fixing a fair rate of
return may be affected by unfinished construction.197
As with accelerated depreciation, the argument can be made that
by allowing the current deduction for taxes Congress is postpon-
ing the tax which would fall on today's ratepayers and placing it
on tomorrow's."' The argument is even weaker in this setting,
however, because under section 167 the tax deduction prior to the
provision for accelerated methods did in fact result in higher
taxes in the earlier years. In this instance, Congress has not cre-
ated a tax deferral for the deliberate purpose of stimulating in-
vestment. The Internal Revenue Code simply treats some charges
in a different way than the ratemakers. The argument that this
somehow unfairly benefits the early year ratepayers is farfetched.
By its nature an income tax is based on the amount of current
income, as adjusted by exclusions, deductions, and exemptions,
and computed by the appropriate tax rate. The tax is paid to a
government to enable that government to provide services to its
current constituents.
Deferral or normalization of the tax benefit results in a
charge to current taxpayers for possible future tax payments.
These future payments are dependent on the tax situation, in-
cluding earnings, deductions, credits, tax rates, and ultimately
the level of government spending during the period when the
items are being amortized. It is therefore appropriate that the
ratepayer at those times be charged with the amounts necessary
to pay those taxes. To normalize is to charge today's ratepayers
with tomorrow's possible taxes. 9'
197. 2 Pun. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 166, 177 (1973); accord, New England Tel. & Tel. Co.,
84 Pun. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 130, 167 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Utils. 1970) (holding flow-through
of'interest deduction related to-capital cost of unfinished construction not inconsistent
with excluding unfinished construction from rate base); Midstate Tel. Co., 10 Pun. U. REp.
4th (PUR) 88, 94 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1975) ("Nevertheless, we admit that there is some force to
the logic of Midstate's proposal to identify income tax savings to the projects which give
rise to those savings. By the same logic, however, we should not charge present customers
the-higher costs of capital associated with the utility's need to expand capacity to meet
future demand, yet we do.").
198. Alabama Power Co., 97 Pun. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 371, 376 (Ala. P.S.C. 1972)
(allowing partial normalization because the flow-through of reduced taxes shifted the
burden of the resulting increased future taxes to future customers).
199. "Flow-through, not normalization, produces equity between current and future
ratepayers." Iowa Power & Light Co., 6 Pun. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 446, 454 (Iowa St.
Comm. Comm'n 1974); accord, Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 22 Pun. U. REP. 4th (PUR)
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Adding to this the absence of a legislative enactment, com-
parable to section 167(1),110 requiring normalization of these
items, it is surprising that so many regulators have allowed it.
Some commissions apparently have been convinced of a need for
increased utility capitalization and convinced that the public will
rebel at the allowance of the real rate of return necessary to raise
this capital, resulting in the legitimization of a scheme to conceal
from the ratepayers how much return the utilities are really re-
ceiving."o'
IV. INVESTMENT TAX CREDITS
The investment tax credit is similar to accelerated deprecia-
tion for ratemaking in that it is also a tax subsidy through which
Congress specifically sought to encourage investment in new fa-
cilities.0 IRC section 46 creates a credit against taxes for up to
60, 82 (S.D. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1977). See notes 123-50 and accompanying text supra.
200. See Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 22 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 60, 82 (S.D. Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1977) (flow-through required because actual taxes paid should constitute
the basis for company's tax allowance unless otherwise precluded by federal law).
The issue of normalization of state income tax benefits is not discussed in the text.
The argument made in Parts II.A.-Ill supra applies also to state tax deductions. Imme-
diate flow-through of such benefits is required for the same reasons. City of Los Angeles
v. California Pub. Util. Comm'n, 7 Cal. 3d 331, 497 P.2d 785, 102 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972);
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 Pus. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 1 (Cal. P.U.C. 1972); Gulf States Util.,
20 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 145, 153-54 (La. P.U.C. 1977); Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 16 PUB.
U. REP. 4th (PUR) 244, 253 (Me. P.U.C. 1976); Central Me. Power Co., 15 PuB. U. REP.
4th (PUR) 455 (Me. P.U.C. 1976); accord, Mars Hill & Blaine Water Co., 19 PUB. U. REP.
4th (PUR) 380, 387-88 (Me. P.U.C. 1977) (rejecting the argument that I.R.C. § 167 (1)
will deprive the company of the tax benefits of accelerated depreciation if the company is
not permitted to normalize state income tax benefits due to accelerated depreciation, and
ordering flow-through of the state benefits). The absence of a statutory requirement for
normalization of state tax benefits is particularly convincing because there is a multiplier
effect on revenue requirements in normalizing state taxes. Such normalized taxes are not
deductible from federal income taxes.
201. See note 159 supra.
202. The investment tax credit, I.R.C. § 46, was originally enacted as § 2 of the
Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, §§ 2(a) - (b), 76 Stat. 960 (1962). President
Kennedy recommended the tax credit to fight recession, stimulate employment, and
increase export markets. He felt that the additional expenditures on plant and equipment
would create more jobs in the "capital goods industries" and that these workers would
create still more jobs in consumer goods and services industries. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1962).
Arguably this act encourages investment in automated equipment, perhaps reducing
employment. Discussion of tax benefits from the standpoint of economic theory related
to fiscal policy is beyond the scope of this article. See, however, Brown, The New Depre-
ciation Policy Under the Income Tax, 8 NAT'L TAX J. 81 (1955) (recommending an invest-
ment tax credit) and Chase, Tax Credits for Investment Spending, 15 NAT'L TAX J. 32
(1962) (recommending lower interest rates or higher personal income taxes with reduced
52
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol30/iss4/2
19791 NORMALIZED TAXES
eleven percent of the costs of constructing or acquiring qualifying
new facilities."3 This credit is not balanced by any future higher
tax and it unquestionably results in a tax saving rather than a tax
deferral. A ratemaking commission can either flow through the
tax benefit to current ratepayers, spread the benefits out over the
life of the asset to which it is related, or allow the ratepayer to
be charged for the tax savings while the stockholders retain all the
benefits.
The theoretical arguments favoring immediate flow-through
of the tax reduction are much the same as those made in the
preceding sections of this article. Normalization results in charg-
ing tomorrow's taxes to today's ratepayer. There were attempts
to justify normalization of accelerated depreciation benefits on
taxes on business income as preferable either to accelerated depreciation or the invest-
ment tax credit).
203. The 1962 Act provided a 7% investment tax credit for investment in equipment
and machinery, but only 3% for public utilities. In proposing the investment tax credit in
1961 Secretary of the Treasury Dillon recommended that utilities be excluded because
incentives are not needed for regulated industries, which are legally required to fill public
demand. Detailed Explanation of the President's Recommendations Contained in His
Message on Taxation: Hearings Before the House Ways & Means Comm., 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 256-57 (1961). Perhaps the reduced credit for utilities was a compromise with this
view.
In 1966 the investment tax credit was suspended until Dec. 31, 1967. Pub. L. No. 89-
800, 80 Stat. 1508, 1514 (1966). The suspension was lifted, however, as of March 9, 1967.
Pub. L. No. 90-26, 81 Stat. 57 (1967). It was repealed altogether in 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
172, tit. VII, § 703, 83 Stat. 660 (1969), and reenacted in 1971 as the Job Development
Investment Credit, at which time the credit allowed to public utilities was increased to
4%, Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. I, § 105, 85 Stat. 497 (1971).
In the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 the limit on the credit was raised to 10% for all
companies including utilities, for property placed in service after Jan. 1, 1975, and before
January 1977. Pub. L. No. 94-12, tit. I, § 301(1)(A), 89 Stat. 26, 36. The credit was
extended until January 1981 under the Tax Reform Act of 1976 together with an extra 1%
or 1 1/2%. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1580 (1976) (codified at § 802(a)(2)). Certified
pollution control facilities under I.R.C. § 169 originally did not qualify for investment tax
credit. I.R.C. § 169(h) (1970). However, a 50% credit is allowed for facilities placed in
service after Dec. 31, 1976. I.R.C. § 46(c)(5).
The amount of the credit is generally limited to the $25,000 in tax liability plus 50%
of the liability in excess of $25,000; however, utilities were authorized for credit of up to
100% in 1975-76, 90% in 1977, 80% in 1978, 70% in 1979, and 60% in 1980. I.R.C. § 46(a)(3)
and (7). The Revenue Bill of 1978 raises the regular limit by 10% per year to a maximum
of 90% for all companies in 1982 and thereafter. It also includes buildings as well as
machinery as property qualifying for the credit. Utility companies will retain the 80% limit
for 1978 and the 70% limit for 1979 and will thereafter be treated as other companies.
I.R.C. § 46(a)(3)-(7).
Excess credits can presently be carried back 3 years or forward 7 years. I.R.C. §
46(b)(1)(A)-(B). Moreover, companies can now elect to use their credit in advance of
placing the property in service with respect to any plant which will take more than 2 years
to build and will have a useful life of at least 7 years. I.R.C. § 46(c).
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the theory that the Internal Revenue Code, by moving the
amount of depreciation around in time, simply changed the year
of the tax, which the regulators at the Congress' insistence have
changed back as far as the ratepayers are concerned. The invest-
ment tax credit was entirely new and did not originally relate in
itself to any particular period. The logical result was to reduce
rates in the year in which the benefit was received."'
The original 1962 Act, however, required that the rate base
be reduced by the amount of deferred income tax credit. This
could have been read as indicating an intention that the credit
not reduce current revenue requirements, because if revenue is
reduced and the rate base reduced also, the company's invest-
ment stimulus would be balanced by the immediate loss of in-
come from the ratepayers. On the other hand, Congress may have
simply intended to require complete flow-through because utili-
ties do not need the incentive.
In an effort to preserve some of the incentive, a ratemaking
scheme was devised and adopted in a few jurisdictions which
flowed through forty-eight percent of the investment tax credit
immediately, representing the amount that would have to be re-
paid to the government at a fifty-two percent tax.rate over the
life of the asset due to the reduced rate base and resulting reduced
depreciation allowance.15 In 1964, Congress acted in two ways. It
eliminated the requirement that the rate base be reduced, en-
couraging immediate flow-through,0 8 but at the same time it pro-
hibited federal regulatory agencies from immediately flowing
through the full benefit."' By 1965, the state commissions were
evenly split between those that required-immediate flow-through
and those that required normalization."'
204. Accounting Procedure for Investment Tax Credit, 49 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 190
(N.Y.P.S.C. 1962); accord, Torrington Water Co., 48 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 1, 5 (Conn.
P.U.C. 1963).
205. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 48 Pun. U. RP. 3d (PUR) 245, 247 (1963).
206. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272,.tit. II, § 203(a), 78 Stat. 33 (1964).
207. The FPC had ordered full flow.through investment tax credit under 1962
Amendment to I.R.C. Accounting Treatment by Public Utility Licenses and Natural Gas
Companies, 31 F.P.C. 175, Interim Order No. R-232 (1964). In 1964, Congress provided
that utilities could not flow-through the credit more than ratably over the useful life of
the property for federal ratemaking purposes. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272,
tit. II, § 203(e)(1), 78 Stat. 33 (1964). "Ratability" is defined to allow a yearly flow-through
in proportion to the depreciable life of the property (without allowing accelerated flow-
through of investment tax credit for companies using accelerated depreciation). See I.R.C.
§ 46(f)(6).
208. What Others Think: Digest of Depreciation and Amortization Practices, 75 Pun.
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The Accounting Principles Board, with some dissent,
adopted a preference for normalization, stating:
In our view the relevant materials support the interpretation
that the investment credit is an administrative procedure to
permit the taxpayer to withhold the cash equivalent of the
credit from taxes otherwise payable and that it is not an element
entering into the computation of taxes related to income of the
period. 0'
This preference was later modified by recognition that flow-
through was also acceptable. 10 The quoted language seems to
contradict what Congress actually did, which was to create a
current income tax credit.
Proponents of normalization of investment tax credit may
also point out that it seems unfair to afford all of the benefit to
the current ratepayers when the property may be used for twenty
or thirty years. This may be acceptable if it is the function of
regulatory commissions to spread utility tax expenses over the
years in an equitable manner; however, it violates the rule of
actual taxes built into the ratemaking method.
The legal as well as equitable duties of the regulator are best
performed by simply letting the taxes fall in the year that they
are collected, leaving it to the legislatures to balance tax collec-
tion with government spending. The legislative story, however,
did not end in 1964. As with accelerated depreciation, Congress
has intervened to require a form of normalization of investment
tax credits. In 1971, Congress mandated certain practices by de-
nial of the credit unless the local ratemaking agencies complied
with certain options given to the utility companies. Under one
option, reduction of the cost of service by the reduced taxes is
prohibited, but the company may reduce its rate base by the
amount of the credit provided the rate base is ratably restored. 1
This treatment is more favorable to the companies than what
might be called "regular normalization," under which the de-
UTIL. Foirr. 62, 64-65 (1965). Some states followed the 52%-48% division, and some left it
up to the companies.
209. [1972] 2 ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, APB ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES: ORIGINAL
PRONOUNCEMENTS (CCH) Op. no. 2, par. 8, at 6507 (issued 1962).
210. Id. Op. no. 4, par. 10, March 1964, at 6574.
211. I.R.C. § 46(f)(1). The limitations discussed in the text were added by the Reve-
nue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. I, § 105(6), 85 Stat. 497, 503 (1971), creating Code
§ 46(e), which was redesignated I.R.C. § 46(f) by the Tax Reduction Act of 1975. Pub. L.
No. 94-12, tit. II, § 302(a), 89 Stat. 26, 40 (1975).
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ferred taxes would be eliminated from the rate base altogether
without later restoration. It appears that the amount restored
cannot be depreciated, but becomes a permanent fund.
212
A second option allows ratable flow-through of the credit,
reducing cost of service over the life of the asset with no reduction
in the rate base either currently or in the future .2 1 This method
is also better than ordinary normalization. The rate base should
be adjusted downward by the amount of the deferred tax out-
standing at any time. An initial reduction in the rate base would
be restored as the credit is used up. Under this option, the com-
pany is allowed to collect the full amount of the tax benefit from
the current ratepayers in the first year, and perhaps the company
earns enough on this amount to pay back the ratable portion for
each year while keeping the amount of the benefit as a permanent
fund on which no interest or dividend will ever be paid. Some
states adopted normalization even before the 1971 amend-
ments,24 but since then almost all states have switched to one of
these two options. 5
There is a third option allowing flow-through for that limited
group of assets described in section 167(l)(2)(c), post-1969 assets
of a type on which flow-through of accelerated depreciation bene-
fits was allowed immediately prior to 1970.218 Lest there be too
212. Such depreciation would reduce the rate base. The regulations are not clear on
this, however. See Treas. Reg. § 1.46-5(c)(3)(1972).
213. I.R.C. § 46(f)(2). The Treasury Department recognizes the windfall presently
given utility investors by § 46(f0, and has proposed the elimination of § 46(f)(2) along
with the amendment of § 46(f)(1) to remove the restoration to rate base. The result
would be that rate base would be permanently reduced by the amount of the credit for
both depreciation and rate of return purposes. Continued Hearings on Tax Expenditures
Focusing on Utility Companies Tax Treatment: Hearings Before Subcommittee on Over-
sight, House Ways and Means Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1979 (March 28, 1979 State-
ment of Emil M. Sunley) (unpublished to date).
214. E.g., Inter-mountain Tel. Co., 59 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 337, 342-43 (Tenn.
P.S.C. 1965) (allowing full normalization); Accounting Procedure for Investment Tax
Credit, 78 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 167, 187 (Fla. P.S.C. 1969).
215. Only one jurisdiction out of 56 was still requiring flow-through of investment tax
credit by 1976, according to the NARUC Report, supra note 80, at 505. The Andersen Co.
study, supra note 80, shows 5 jurisdictions still flowing-through investment tax credit.
In addition, some commission orders seem to ignore the 1971 amendment by deducting
the deferred taxes from rate base without mention of any ratable restoration. E.g., Moun-
tain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 8 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 547, 550 (Ariz. Corp. Comm'n 1975);
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 8 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 75, 80 (Minn. P.S.C. 1974); North-
western Bell Tel. Co., 15 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 289, 295 (S.D.P.U.C. 1976).
216. I.R.C. § 46(f)(3). See note 74 and accompanying text supra. At least one com-
pany is still apparently on option 3. Washington Utils. and Transp. Comm'n v. Pacific
Power & Light, 10 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 449,455 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n 1975);
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much flqw-through, however, Congress has further limited this
option by providing, in a wonderful example of Internal Revenue
Code linguistics, that any such election should apply only to the
credit "determinable as if the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 and the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 had not been enacted."2 7 Presumably
this means a company can only get up to a four percent invest-
ment tax credit if it is so unworldly as to elect option three.2"8
Finally, IRC section 46(a)(2)(B)(i) provides for an extra one
percent of investment tax credit for money paid out by the com-
pany to purchase its own stock on behalf of its employees." 9 IRC
section 46(f)(9) denies any extra credit under this last section if
cost of service is reduced by the credit for ratemaking, if the rate
base is reduced for ratemaking, or if any part of the credit is
treated in any way "other than as though it had been contributed
by the taxpayer's common shareholders. '"2 0 Thus the Internal
Revenue Code specifically requires the payment of the ratepay-
ers' money rather than stockholders' money for the purpose of
buying corporate stock for the companies' employees. In this in-
stance, the prohibition is not only against ratable flow-through or
reduction of the rate base, but also against reduction of the cost
of service or the rate base at any time. In short, the so-called tax
benefit is available only if charged fully to the ratepayers as
Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. Pacific Power & Light, 7 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR)
470, 487 (Wash. Util. Transp. Comm'n 1974). But see I.R.S. ruling, Nov. 22, 1976, regard-
ing Southern Cal. Gas Co., No. 85627 (Cal. P.U.C. 1976), and Southern Cal. Gas Co.,
No. 86118 (Cal. P.U.C. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n, 23 Cal. 3d 470, 591 P.2d 34, 153 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1979) (denying investment tax
credit, where a company with property eligible for option 3 declined to exercise it and
exercised option 2 instead, and the California Commission lowered its rate of return by
.25% to take account of the reduced risk). The California Supreme Court held specifi-
cally that reduction in rate of return was not bound by §§ 46(0(2) or (8), but that if tax
credit was later denied the company could then petition the commission for appropriate
relief. Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 591 P.2d 34, 42-43, 153 Cal. Rptr.
10, 18-20 (1979). The company has petitioned for rehearing. Doc. No. SF-23495.
217. I.R.C. § 46(f)(8). This subsection is replete with other options the general effect
of which is to require the companies to make new elections to continue option 3. See also
Temp. Reg. § 9.1(c)(2) (requiring a company to recite that any option 3 election is a
voluntary act not imposed by any agency). As to how the first 4% of tax credit is distrib-
uted when a company has some option 3 property and other option 1 or 2 property, see
Temp. Reg. § 9.1(a)(3).
218. But see Temp. Reg. § 9.1(a)(2) indicating that other increases in the amount of
benefits available are also to be denied, without mentioning possible decreases.
219. The credit can be extended another /2% simply by having the employees con-
tribute toward the stock purchase an additional sum equal to this amount, which can be
easily reimbursed in extra salaries. I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(B)(ii).
220. The employer contributions are not deductible. See Proposed Reg. § 1.46-8.
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though there were no benefit and if the company can also earn a
full return on the benefit as if it had been actually contributed
by the shareholders.
The California Public Utilities Commission has tried to sof-
ten the effects of normalization. While complying with the second
option by allowing normalization with no reduction of the rate
base and ratable flow-through of the credit, it ordered that the
ratable amount of investment tax credit to be flowed through
should be subject to an annual adjustment to reflect growth in the
total investment tax credit based on the most recent estimate of
eligible plant additions to be added in the next year. Thus, if
there is an estimated growth in investment tax credit each year,
there will be a larger share subject to ratable flow-through, reduc-
ing the revenue requirement to some extent.
21
As with the part of the California decision on annual adjust-
ments for growth in accumulated deferred taxes from accelerated
depreciation,12 the Internal Revenue Service has issued an ad-
verse ruling, although in this case the ruling is more understanda-
ble. 22 The crux of the opinion letter is simply that by including
the adjustment to the ratable portion of the credit based on esti-
mated growth of investments in new property without including
an adjustment to the rate base to reflect such growth, the rate
base would be considered reduced in violation of section
46(f)(2) (B).22 Similarly, approaching the question from the posi-
tion of option one, the letter ruling states that the failure to adjust
the rate base on the basis of the new investment implies no in-
crease in annual depreciation expense reflective of the increase in
depreciation base from the projected new investment, which is
viewed by the IRS as reducing the cost of service in violation of
section 46(f)(2)(A).=
The ruling exhibits two flaws. First, it seems to assume that
every increase in investment would increase the rate base, while
it is possible, indeed likely, that much of the new investment
expense allowed as proper for investment tax credit purposes
would not go into the rate base until completion of a new plant,
221. Pacific Tel. & Tel., No. 87838, Slip. op. at 29 (Cal. P.U.C., filed Oct. 13, 1978).
See note 88 supra. Appeal and further litigation has so far upheld the commission deci-
sion. See notes 100.102 supra.
222. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
223. Letter of July 27, 1978, from John W. Holt, Director, Corporation Tax Division,
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possibly a period of ten or more years."' Second, it strains the
language to say that a mere failure to project the rate base up-
ward results in a reduction of the rate base or of annual deprecia-
tion expense. Traditionally, the regulatory agencies are allowed
some degree of discretion in making pro forma adjustments, or
adjustment of test year data for known or reasonably calculable
and more current variations.ss This clause is less objectionable
than the adjustment clause dealing with accelerated depreciation
benefits approved by the California commission because the ef-
fect on related items is not as demonstrable. 22 The commission
ruling was affirmed by denial of review, and the companies have
failed, so far, in their effort to enjoin enforcement of the commis-
sion order.22 The tangle once again suggests that Congress recon-
sider either its entire policy of granting incentive tax benefits to
regulated companies or its policy requiring normalization. The
California commission suggested that Congress resolve the differ-
ence by enacting a gross receipts or unit consumption tax for
utilities instead of the income tax.sso
V. LEGAL INFIRMITIES OF NORMALIZATION
A. The Statutory and Constitutional Duty to Set Just and
Reasonable Rates
Up to this point, the primary thrust of this article has been
to show that the practice of including fictitious taxes in current
rates and deferring the tax benefits until later years is unwise,
unfair to current ratepayers, and unduly generous to future rater
payers who receive the benefits of the tax monies collected from
today's ratepayers. Arguments have been advanced that regula-
tory commissions should not allow normalization by rule or by
ratemaking decisions and that Congress should reconsider and
repeal the legislation that has favored its allowanceY' This sec-
tion examines whether the allowance of fictitious taxes is lawful
under the traditional statutory and constitutional standards of
ratemaking.
226. See note 203 supra (regarding the allowance of progress payments on long-term
construction to be included for investment tax credit).
227. See note 142 and accompanying text supra.
228. See note 95 supra (concerning adjustment clauses).
229. See notes 100-102 supra concerning review of this order.
230. See Pacific Tel. & Tel., No. 87838, Slip op. at 46 (Cal. P.U.C., filed Oct. 13,
1978).
231. I.R.C. §§ 167(l), 46(f).
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If a regulatory agency is performing its duty, it must set rates
designed to secure a reasonable return to the regulated com-
pany.2sz By adding the amount of a fictitious expense, a regula-
tory agency is granting more than a reasonable return.23 If the
agency allows the expense but reduces the rate of return to com-
pensate for the windfall, it simply commits a second wrong by not
allowing the proper rate of return.ss This type of evasion results
in a virtually unreviewable order, because there is not a proper
finding as to either cost of service or rate of return.25
Almost all utility regulatory bodies are authorized to estab-
lish maximum rates which are "just and reasonable."' ' s Arguably,
in setting such rates the commission is engaged in a "legislative"
activity that may not be reviewed by a court. The courts have
routinely reviewed rate cases, however, and generally statutes in
most jurisdictions require review at least to determine if the order
is lawful, within the agency's jurisdiction and discretion, reasona-
ble, not arbitrary and capricious, and supported by the evi-
dence. 23' Although statutory language of this kind does not pro-
232. E.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898). See also note 22supra, for typical
statutes requiring a reasonable return.
233. See Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426, 429 (1936) (affirming disallowance of
fictitious salary expense). Galveston Elec. Co. v. City of Galveston, 258 U.S. 388 (1922)
(disallowance of hypothetical broker's fees approved where under existing practice it could
not be shown as a real expense). In Edison Light & Power Co. v. Driscoll, 25 F. Supp. 192
(E.D. Pa. 1938), the court stated that
the rights of both the public and the corporation must be considered. The
company is entitled to a fair return on a fair value of its property devoted to
the public service. The return can not be so high as to exceed the value of the
service to the consumer and can not be so low as to confiscate the property
devoted to that service. In other words the company is entitled to ask a fair
return upon the value of the property which it employs for the public conveni-
ence and the public is entitled to demand that no more be exacted from it than
the services rendered are reasonably worth.
Id. at 193; accord, Lakewood Water & Power Co., 21 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 103 (Cal.
P.U.C. 1957) (All charges made by a utility against its ratepayers must be reasonable and
it is the duty of the commission to prevent a utility from passing on to ratepayers unrea-
sonable costs of materials or services).
234. The agency may also be engaging in a subterfuge prohibited by congressional
requirement of normalization. See note 231 supra.
235. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 115 Vt. 494,498, 66 A.2d 135, 138 (1949) (reversing
for lack of adequate findings a commission order that failed to establish a proper rate base
and allowable expenses).
236. E.g., Natural Gas Act, §§ 4-5 15 U.S.C. §§ 717(c) - (d) (1976). State statutes
have similar provisions. See note 22 supra.
237. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976); Mo. Rzv. STAT. §
536.140 (Vernon Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.20 (West Supp. 1978). The Supreme
Court has held the determination of just and reasonable rates to be a quasi-judicial act.
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vide complete guidance, some generalizations are possible. The
substantial evidence rule is leading away from judicial reversals
of administrative determinations of factual issues."' When the
question is the legal interpretation of a statutory requirement,
however, the courts will and should intervene even if a policy
issue is involved.2 3 Language in some of the opinions indicates
that the question of normalization is a policy decision that should
be left to the agencies, 240 but these are generally self-serving con-
clusions designed to strengthen the argument in favor of a partic-
ular result.
The question of whether current ratepayers can be charged
for future or fictitious taxes must be resolved as a legal question
to preserve any legal review of rates. If fictitious charges can be
included in rates, the agencies are free from any control; any
legally allowable return could be supplemented by adding ficti-
tious costs and the courts would be powerless to intervene to
enforce the legislative requirement of just and reasonable rates.
The legality of rates, however, has long been considered an appro-
priate subject for court determination. Most attention has fo-
cused on review requested by the utilities, and there are well-
established statutory and constitutional duties to provide a regu-
lated utility with a fair return on its property devoted to public
service. 2
1
Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936). But see United States v. Florida East Coast
Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (allowing ratemaking without an admiministrative hearing
where the case did not involve a set of disputed facts).
238. 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 42, at 438-39. At one time it was held that due process
required the opportunity for a reviewing court to determine both law and facts indepen-
dently where confiscation was claimed. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon
Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920).
239. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355
U.S. 83 (1957); Federal Power Comm'n v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 307 U.S. 156 (1939);
Huntley v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 69 Cal. 2d 67, 442 P.2d 685, 69 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1968);
W.S. Hatch Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 3 Utah 2d 7, 10, 277 P.2d 809, 811 (1954).
240. See Order 530B, supra note 180; Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Fed.
Power Comm'n, 359 F.2d 318, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1966) (approving FPC shift from normaliza-
tion to flow-through, and adopting view of Solicitor General expressed in opposition to
grant of certiorari in El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 281 F.2d 567
(5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 366 U.S. 912 (1961),
that no general issue of law was involved, but merely a discretionary choice between
accounting systems).
241. The state may not, under the guise of regulating rates, require a utility to serve
the public without reward or do that which amounts to a taking of private property for
public use without just compensation. Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886).
Such deprivation is a denial of due process and equal protection. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S.
466, 523-24 (1898).
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This duty is made clear by a long line of Supreme Court
opinions addressing the question of what value to place on a
utility's property. In Smyth v. Ames,"' the Court held that for the
company to receive the just compensation to which it was enti-
tled, it must earn a proper return based on the fair value of the
property dedicated to public service, considering the original
cost, costs of improvements, the market value of its securities,
present reproduction costs, and the probable earning capacity of
the property.
In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service
Commission, decided during a period of considerable inflation,
the majority held that the present cost of replacement was a most
important element of value.243 Justice Brandeis, in his concur-
rence, suggested that the proper measure of value was the actual
capital prudently invested by the company.2 4 For present pur-
poses it is only necessary to note that all views recognized a con-
stitutional obligation to grant a fair return.
Subsequently, in a line of cases culminating with Federal
Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas,25 the Supreme Court
ostensibly escaped the rate base valuation quandary by holding
that the Commission need only set rates which enable the com-
pany to operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity,
and to attract capital by providing a return commensurate with
return on investments having corresponding risks.26 The Court
used language indicating that the reviewing courts should not be
as concerned with theory or the method of setting the revenue
requirement as with assuring that the overall effect or impact is
reasonable.2 7 Hope presented a question of statutory review of the
reasonableness of rates for interstate sales of gas set by the Fed-
eral Power Commission. The case did not hold that constitutional
limits had been ended, but merely that they were not greater than
the statutory limits.2 8 Hope has been perceived by state courts
and commissions as setting constitutional standards.249 However,
242. 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 (1898).
243. 262 U.S. 276, 288 (1923).
244. Id. at 310.
245. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
246. Id. at 605-07.
247. Id. at 602.
248. Id. at 607.
249. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 34 Puo. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 78, 89 (La. P.S.C. 1960);
New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. New Hampshire, 104 N.H. 229, 232, 183 A.2d 237, 240
(1962); Narrangansett Elec. Co. v. Kennelly, 88 R.I. 56, 71, 143 A.2d 709, 718 (1958).
[Vol. 30
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Hope, together with the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,25 may
be read as erasing the constitutional protection of the utility
investor.25' The Court's opinion in Hope does not specifically end
the duty to the investor, but rather redefines the standards for
evaluating performance of that duty. The old standards, based on
trying to properly define the value of utility property, are re-
placed with a still more elusive set of guidelines, based on pre-
dicting the rate of return that will maintain confidence in the
company's financial integrity and attract the necessary capital to
adequately serve the customers."'
In the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,"3 the Court allowed
the setting of natural gas prices on a producing-area basis, ap-
250. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
251. Bernstein, Utility Rate Regulation: The Little Locomotive That Couldn't, 1970
WASH. U.L.Q. 223, 260.
252. 320 U.S. at 605. For a contemporary state court explanation of this duty, see
New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 390 A.2d 8, 14, 15, 30-39 (Me.
1978).
The regulatory industry has attempted to meet these standards in a number of ways.
The most common method used is discounted cash flow, in which a group of comparable
utility companies is picked by descriptive qualities (such as size, mix of service furnished,
etc.) and then compared to the first for which rates are being set in terms of growth of
both dividend yield and book or market value over a period of time. There is considerable
disagreement concerning how these comparisons should be made. See C. PHILLIPS, THE
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 284-88 (1969); P. GARFIELD & W. LoVEJoy, PUBLIC UTILITY
ECONOMICS 125-34 (1964).
A second method is based on the capital asset pricing model. See Sharp, Capital
Assets Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. OF FINANCE
425 (1964). The technique was developed for general investment purposes. As applied to
utility rates the method uses a number of data readings for a large group of firms including
nonutilities over a reasonably long period of time (usually at least 60 months) to identify
firms of comparable risk to the utility in question in terms of demonstrated similarity in
market behavior. A recommended rate of return on equity is derived by an averaging
method applied to the returns earned by these "comparable" firms.
A third method, stochastic dominance, uses a similar data base but derives the
comparison group by means of comparing the company in question with other companies
in terms of their "dominance" or preferability to an imaginary "risk averse" investor,
disguised as a computer, who wants to earn a return with as little risk as possible. See
Porter & Gaumnitz, Stochastic Dominance v. Mean-Variance Portfolio Analysis: An
Empirical Evaluation, 62 Am. ECON. Rzv. 438 (1972).
Unfortunately, utility common stock prices may relate to different factors at different
times. At present, they seem to relate most closely to utility bond prices and the general
interest rate. If one could predict with accuracy what tomorrow's investors will do there
would be no problem. It is doubtful, however, whether a person or even a computer can
perform this magic with complete success in the long run. On the other hand few utility
companies have folded in the years since the Bluefield-Hope formulation has been in force.
Perhaps the vagueness of the formula itself has assured the investment community that
the commissions will over the long run have to grant a reasonable return.
253. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
1979]
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proving possible different rates for each producing area. This
method seems to depart substantially from the concept of a re-
turn on rate base, and the Court's opinion states that the investor
interest is only one of the calculable interests, and a return on
investment can be stringently limited.2"4 Nevertheless, the opin-
ion falls short of totally abandoning review of the substantive
reasonableness of rates. In the first place the setting of rates for
gas producers by the Federal Power Commission and the setting
of electric, telephone or retail gas rates at a local level is not
analogous; the former deals with a competitive situation and the
later with a monopolistic one.
In concluding that Permian "abandons even the limited
scope of review of the substantive reasonableness of rates that it
retained in Hope," Professor Bernstein emphasizes that language
in the opinion stating that the court should not supplant the
commission's balance of interests with one more to its liking, but
should merely assure itself that the commission has given rea-
soned consideration to each of the pertinent factors .5 In the same
paragraph, however, the Court stated that the reviewing court
must determine if the commission abused its discretion or ex-
ceeded its authority, examine the manner in which the Commis-
sion employed the methods of regulation selected and decide
whether each essential element of the order is supported by sub-
stantial evidence, and determine whether the order may reasona-
bly be expected to maintain financial intergrity, attract necessary
capital, fairly compensate investors for their risk and yet provide
appropriate protection to the relevant public interests, existing
and foreseeable.26 Thus Permian specifically repeats the Hope
requirements. Financial integrity cannot be maintained nor capi-
tal attracted without allowing a fair return on capital. Particu-
larly with a regulated utility, yield is the factor investors look at
first. Although the quibbling about the rate base definition may
be over, the regulation of returns still entails due process consid-
erations. Indeed, the reasonability of the revenue return is so
interwoven and so central to the outcome of utility regulation
that it cannot be freed from court review unless the whole rate-
making process is placed beyond review.
The courts have not indicated a willingness to surrender the
254. Id. at 796-800.
255. Bernstein, supra note 251 at 258 (quoting 390 U.S. at 791-92).
256. 390 U.S. at 792.
[Vol. 30
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power to review the reasonability of the revenue return.27 Neither
the companies nor the consumers have mounted any recent at-
tack on review. The post-1935 Supreme Court has not held rates
to be confiscatory as frequently as in the past, and perhaps other
courts have learned that their own judgments on this issue are not
beyond challenge.2 8 An equally important factor is that the com-
missions have learned the lesson of Hope so well that they do not
often come close to setting confiscatory rates. In addition, some
commissions have perhaps learned to hide their conclusions in
terms of the exercise of discretion.29 Unless a commission is hon-
est and articulate about what it is doing, however, review is im-
possible. This is precisely why Permian tells us that
[j]udicial review of the Commission's orders will therefore
function accurately and efficaciously only if the Commission
indicates fully and carefully the methods by which, and the
purposes for which it has chosen to act, as well as its assessment
of the consequences of its orders for the character and future
development of the industry."'0
The emphasis on consistency of a commission's actions with
its own selected method of setting rates suggests that normaliza-
tion is well within the area left for judicial review. Present day
courts will not frequently set aside a commission order on revenue
requirements because of an insufficient rate of return without
positive evidence that the rate will actually produce a dangerous
257. See Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 635, 651
(1945), affirming an order in which the Court was unable to say that on evidence the return
was not commensurate with the risk, that investor confidence was impaired or that com-
pany ability to attract capital and to operate successfully had been impeded. The state
commissions and courts have continued to exercise their power to prevent confiscation
under the due process clause. E.g., New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub.
Utils., 327 Mass. 81, 94-95, 97 N.E.2d 509, 516-17 (1951); City of Scottsbluff v. United
Tel. Co., 31 Pus. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 446, 450 (Neb. St. Ry. Comm'n 1959) (municipal tax
held confiscatory in absence of commission authorization for tax to be passed on to cus-
tomers within the municipality, since increasing company's expenses reduces its rate of
return).
258. See New Jersey Power and Light Co., 9 N.J. 498, 89 A.2d 26 (1952) (dictum)
(due process is violated only when the rate base determination, allowances of income and
operating expense and rate of return are illegally arrived at or not determined at all); New
England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 327 Mass. 81, 97-98, 97 N.E.2d 509,
518 (1951).
259. For instance, if there is evidence to support a range of rate of return on equity
between 9% and 16% the commission can afford to give in to the company's argument for
normalization but allow a rate of return closer to the 9% figure without running any serious
risk of reversal on the rate of return issue.
260. 390 U.S. at 792.
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effect on the company's ability to raise needed capital. On the
other hand, when rates are set including a fictitious expense in
addition to a fair rate of return, the decision must be considered
arbitrary and can be set aside to the same extent as if a commis-
sion arbitrarily ignored an actual expense. The courts must re-
solve the legal question whether the allowance of a fictitious ex-
pense is consistent with ratemaking in its present form. 26' The
broad discretion exercised by regulatory commissions concerning
the proper rate of return itself requires that close attention be
given to cost of service and rate base items in order to preserve
any legal control over the system.
22
The cases dealing with the existence of a constitutional duty
to the utility company have been reviewed because it is in this
area that most of the litigation has occurred. Until recent years,
appeals by the consumer were rare. There are fewer cases expli-
cating the constitutional duty to the ratepayers. Such a duty,
however, has been recognized from the beginning. "The question
of reasonability of a rate . . . , involving as it does the element
of reasonableness both as regards the company and as regards the
public is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring
due process of law for its determination.
' ' 263
261. Justice Jackson, concurring in Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320
U.S. 591 (1944), observed that if the Court is to hold a rate reasonable merely because
the commission says it is reasonable, review itself "becomes a costly time-consuming
pageant of no practical value to anyone." Id. at 645.
262. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63, 70-76 (1935)
(reversing state court affirmance of commission order that improperly disallowed various
expenses without evidence of negligence or impropriety on part of the company incurring
them); Lincoln Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250 U.S. 256, 267-68 (1919)
(finding error in allowance of unpaid taxes and too liberal allowance for working capital
and other expenses sufficient to offset an otherwise confiscatory rate of return); Chicago
& Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892) (affirming rates as nonconfiscatory
in the absence of full record demonstating that company had not managed to "transfer
its earnings into what it is pleased to call 'operating expenses' "Id. at 345-46); Arkansas-
Louisiana Gas Co. v. City of Texarkana, 96 F.2d 179, 187 (8th Cir. 1938) (affirming
disallowance of expense due to gas leakage in excess of a reasonable allowance); San Diego
Water Co. v. City of San Diego, 118 Cal. 556, 572, 50 P. 633, 638 (1897) (all expenses must
be shown to be actual and property charges); Westwood Lake, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade
County Water and Sewer Bd., 203 So. 2d 363, 365-66 (Fla. App. 1967) (reversing order
reducing executive compensation); Davenport Water Co. v. Iowa St. Comm. Comm'n, 190
N.W.2d 583, 607-09 (Iowa 1971) (affirming disallowance of charitable contribution, but
reversing because of use of improper formula to reduce property tax allowance); New Eng-
land Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 360 Mass. 443, 484-92, 275 N.E.2d 493,
518-22 (1971) (reversing because of commission failure to allow charitable contributions
and contractual wage increases).
263. Chicago, Mil. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890); accord, Smyth
v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 544, 547 (1898) (stating that the fair value principle was required
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The duty to protect the public against gouging by the owners
of monopolies is actually the basis of regulation, " ' and the duty
to avoid confiscatory rates merely acts as a check on that regula-
tory power. Review on the side of the company would be difficult
to justify without review on the side of the public. The right of a
utility to charge unlimited rates and a commission approval of an
unreasonably high return would of course, if exercised, be in itself
a confiscation of the property of its industrial and commercial
customers that would deprive them of the opportunity to employ
that property in a profitable manner. Indeed, even if there was
conceded to be no further due process duty to the companies
(which, after all, are able to close their plants and go out of
business), there is still a duty to the public who is entitled to
receive the necessary services at just and reasonable prices.',5
to protect the public from overcharge as well as to protect the company from under-
charge). See also Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585-
86 (1942) (indicating that the constitutional and statutory "reasonability" standards for
minimum rates are the same and adopting the notion that there is a zone of reasonableness
above the lowest nonconfiscatory rate in which rates are constitutionally allowable, thus
implying a constitutional ceiling to this zone). See Georgia Power Co. v. Georgia Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 231 Ga. 339, 201 S.E.2d 423 (1973).
264. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
265. Edison Light & Power Co. v. Driscoll, 25 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1938); Wood v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 288, 481 P.2d 823, 93 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1971) (rejecting on
the merits equal protection claim against credit rules adopted by the commission); State
ex rel. Electric Co. v. Atkinson, 275 Mo. 325, 337, 204 S.W. 897, 899 (1918) (in upholding
issuance of certificate of convenience and necessity to a competing company where the
licensed firm was gouging, the court stated, "The spirit of this [regulatory] policy is the
protection of the public. The protection given the utility is incidental."); New England
Tel. & Tel. Co., 85 PuB. U. REP. (NS) (PUR) 232 (N.H.P.S.C. 1950); Virginia v. Virginia
Elec. and Power Co., 211 Va. 758, 180 S.E.2d 675 (1971) (rates fixed by the commission
should be just and reasonable to the consumers as well as to the utility). Contra, City of
Birmingham v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 234 Ala. 526, 533, 176 So. 301, 306 (1937);
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. City of New York, 50 Misc. 450, 100 N.Y.S. 570 (1906) (denying
to the city, on behalf of the public, the right to inspect a utility company's books, and
stating that the customer has no constitutional right to a reasonable price, because he is
not under an obligation to purchase gas). See St. Paul Book & Stationery Co. v. St. Paul
Gaslight Co., 130 Minn. 71, 153 N.W. 262 (1915) (holding that exorbitant prices amount
to an enforced taking of whatever the consumer pays in excess of a reasonable charge,
but denying injunctive relief where a suit for damages or appeal of the administrative
order were available remedies).
The existence of a duty to ratepayers has been discussed in several recent notes and
comments as a question of whether there is a protected property interest on the part of
the ratepayer under the fourteenth amendment. Note, Due Process Restraint on the Use
of Automatic Adjustment Clauses in Utility Rate Schedules, 18 AmIz. L. Rav. 453 (1976);
Note, Due Process and the Automatic Fuel Adjustment Clause, 52 IND. L.J. 637 (1977);
Note, Due Process: Applicability to Utility Rates, State ex rel. Jackson County v. Public
Sero. Comm'n 42 Mo. L. REv. 152 (1977). These discussions and the cases therein dis-
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The numerous cases developing the rule that allows only the
actual company taxes to be charged to the ratepayer are based
on the legal duty to provide just rates and the principle that the
allowance of fictitious expenses is unlawful. Without going so far
as to say that the consumer always has a constitutionally pro-
tected property interest in just and reasonable rates, the proposi-
tion that they do not have such an interest when it comes to the
matter of normalization of taxes is certainly easy to reject. The
effect and apparent intention of the normalization method is to
make the customer involuntarily into an investor, at least tempo-
rarily.266 If the stockholder who chooses to invest in a utility has
a constitutional right to a reasonable return on his money, how
can there not be a constitutional right of the ratepayer either to
a similar return on his money invested by operation of law or a
right to withhold such investment? The allowance of normaliza-
tion in every instance gives the utility company and the investor
the right to use the ratepayers' dollars without the allowance of
a return. Surely the ratepayers' rights in this instance are as great
as the rights of the voluntary investor.
In summary, rates set to include recovery of fictitious taxes
clearly violate the statutory duties to set just and reasonable
cussed relate to procedural due process rights of the ratepayer to a hearing in various
situations, such as the use of automatic escalator clauses based on fuel prices, City of
Chicago v. Illinois Comm. Comm'n, 13 Ill. 2d 607, 150 N.E.2d 776 (1958); City of Norfolk
v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 197 Va. 505, 90 S.E.2d 140 (1955); the allowance of rate
increases (usually temporary) without a prior hearing, Hartford Consumer Activist Ass'n
v. Hausman, 381 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Conn. 1974); Sellers v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 372
F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Holt v. Yonce, 370 F. Supp. 374 (D.S.C. 1973), aff'd mem.,
415 U.S. 969 (1974); State ex rel. Jackson County v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 532 S.W.2d
20 (Mo. 1976); and the adoption of credit rules without a prior hearing, Wood v. Public
Utils. Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 288, 481 Pa. 2d 823, 93 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1971).
All of these cases involve "procedural" due process in the narrow sense that the
question considered was the adequacy of the procedures carried out. Such issues are not
likely to arise with respect to the matters discussed in this article, as ultimately all
interested parties are usually allowed to participate in rate hearings and the results are
required by law to be based on substantial evidence.
The constitutional review of rate orders concerning arbitrariness or unreasonability
is frequently called procedural due process because of the fiction that the commissioners
could not have followed due process if their order is unreasonable. This standard of review
is more accurately described by the older name, substantive due process. Whether one
calls it procedural or substantive, however, there simply has been no case holding directly
or indirectly that the basic issue of the reasonability of revenue allowed to be recovered
by a utility is not subject to review under constitutional standards.
266. Davenport Water Co., 76 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 209, 237 (Iowa St. Comm.
Comm'n 1968); New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 13 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 65, 85 (Me.
P.U.C. 1976) (quoting Central Me. Power Co., 17 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 452 (Me. P.U.C.
1957)).
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rates. The courts have consistently held that there are correspon-
ding constitutional duties and that the state commissions may
not legally set such rates under any of the applicable standards.
Because of the constitutional limits set by the Supreme Court,
the congressional requirement of normalization must be invalid
to the extent that it conflicts with such limits.
B. Abuse of the Taxing Power
Prior to the formulation of normalization, the general rule in
setting rates was that income taxes were considered an operating
expense to be recovered as a cost of service.28 7 On this basis,
revenue requirement is computed by allowing the company to
recover its "actual" income taxes.
2 68
The "actual taxes" rule has frequently been applied to pre-
vent normalization, 29 and normalization has been allowed pri-
marily as the result of congressional tax laws which in effect have
converted or extended tax code business stimuli into forced rate-
payer advances. The tax benefit is not given unless the ratepayers
pay an equivalent amount.20 The tax law is thus being used solely
for regulatory purposes.
Although Congress may have the power to regulate intrastate
rates,2'7 even under the commerce power there would be some
limit to this authority. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, the Court indicated that Congress must have a rational
basis for concluding that the prohibited activity affects intrastate
commerce, and that the means chosen to achieve the desired
result must be reasonable and appropriate. 2 A more important
limitation on the commerce power for purposes of this discussion
267. Note 141 supra.
268. Note 142 supra.
269. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 28 Pun. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 171, 192-94
(N.Y.P.S.C. 1959); City of Pittsburgh v. Public Util. Comm'n, 182 Pa. Super. 551, 128
A.2d 372, 385 (1956); United Fuel Gas Co., 46 Pun. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 118, 128 (W. Va.
P.S.C. 1962). See also cases cited in note 52 supra.
270. See Part II.B. and Part IV supra.
271. See Railroad Comm'n of Wis. v. Chicago B. & 0. R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922)
(allowing congressional regulation of intrastate railroad rates). Electricity does not move
through states carrying other goods as do railroads, and federal regulation might have to
be based upon the indirect effects of intrastate electric rates on interstate commerce.
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (allowing congressional regulation of farm
production for intrastate sales and home use). Because of distribution line loss electricity
does not have a truly national market as does wheat, but it can easily be distributed
across state lines.
272. 379 U.S. 241, 258-59, 62 (1964).
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is the tenth amendment preservation of the governmental power
of the states. In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Court
invalidated federal legislation requiring state compliance with
the Fair Labor Standards Act.273 This commerce power legislation
was intended to assure wage parity between state employees and
most federal and private employees on a uniform national basis.
By contrast, the federal purpose for normalization is very weak,
and the imposition on state government is much greater. The
states, which are charged with the responsibility for setting just
utility rates and which have regulatory commissions which are
legally and politically held responsible for this task, are required
to severely alter their normal ratemaking practices in favor of the
regulated companies. An unreasonable complication is raised in
carrying out an already difficult and complex state governmental
operation.
Arguably, Congress cannot force states to regulate in accord-
ance with federal requirements, even when the regulations them-
selves might be valid under the commerce power were they to be
enforced directly by the federal government. The intrusion on
state government is too great and violates the tenth amendment
when less intrusive means are available. 24 There is great doubt
whether this type of federal legislation could be sustained under
the commerce power. The utility income tax normalization may
not affect commerce, because the utilities are required to meet
the demand for service by building adequate power generating
facilities even without the benefit of federal subsidies. If the sub-
sidies are not sustainable, their normalization would fail for the
same reason. Moreover, conceding that Congress might reasona-
bly under the commerce power subsidize utility construction by
tax relief, normalization may not be a reasonable means to ac-
complish this because the interference with state ratemaking is
out of proportion to the subsidization purpose.
This point has been developed to show the limitations on
Congress created by the commerce clause, under which congres-
sional interference with state activities has been most frequently
tested and most broadly expanded. In this instance, however,
273. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
274. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 992-94 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also
Brown v. EPA, 1521 F.2d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 1975); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 225
(4th Cir. 1975). On appeal of these cases the Supreme Court denied review because the
federal government conceded that it could not require the states to promulgate the regula-
tions in question. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (per curiam).
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Congress has not purported to protect the flow of interstate com-
merce, 25 but has simply exercised the taxing power to require
certain state regulatory practices and results. This is not a case
in which a taxing penalty is used to aid in a scheme designed to
regulate commerce."' Congress has not articulated or achieved
any recognizable goal relating to the flow of commerce by this
legislation.
Setting aside the commerce clause, the legislation requiring
normalization is also questionable when considered simply as a
taxing measure. Modem cases have tended to uphold federal tax-
ing statutes when their primary purpose is to regulate questiona-
ble activities such as firearms sales, drug transactions and book-
making.77 In each instance, however, the Court has noted that
the tax produced revenue and therefore was supported by the
taxing power.2 8 There is no case upholding a regulatory tax stat-
ute which does not produce some tax revenue. In Minor v. United
States,7 9 the Court sustained convictions under a taxing statute
making it illegal to sell heroin except upon an official order blank,
which was in fact unobtainable for heroin sales. The only chal-
275. Such regulation is legitimately carried on by the states under the police power,
even if it may affect interstate commerce. The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 432
(1913); Searsport Water Co., 118 Me. 382, 387, 108 A. 452, 454-55 (1919). In recent years
there have been proposals for direct federal intervention in states' ratemaking. See Elec-
tric Utility Rate Reform and Regulatory Improvement: Hearings on H.R. 12461, H.R. 2633
and H.R. 2650 (tits. VII and VIII), H.R. 6696, H.R. 10869, H.R. 11475, H.R. 12872 before
the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Intrastate and Foreign
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1 & 2 (1976). The Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act, codified in part at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2601 (Cum. Supp. 1979), requires state commissions
to consider a number of ratemaking options, including time-of-day pricing, seasonal rates,
lifeline, as well as imposes restrictions on the procedures used in automatic adjustment
clauses and in the inclusion of advertising expenses. State autonomy over rates, however,
is specifically preserved. Id. at § 2627.
276. In such case a tax penalty would ordinarily be valid. Sunshine Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 394 (1940).
277. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) (tax on persons engaged in busi-
ness of receiving wagers); United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950) (tax on transfer of
marijuana to unregistered person); Sonsinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937) (li-
cense tax on dealers in firearms).
278. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953). In Kahriger, the Court stated:
Penalty provisions in tax statutes added for breach of regulation concerning
activities in themselves subject only to state regulation have caused this Court
to declare the enactments invalid. Unless there are provisions extraneous to any
tax need, courts are without authority to limit the exercise of the taxing power.
All the provisions of this excise are adapted to the collection of a valid tax.
Id. at 31 (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44-45 (1950);
Sonsinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937).
279. 396 U.S. 87 (1969).
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lenge to the statute was based on denial of the privilege against
self-incrimination; an abuse of the taxing power was not directly
at issue. Nevertheless, Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black,
dissented on the ground that the critical element of the statute
had to be collection of the tax, which was impossible because the
form was unavailable for sale of this particular drug. He seems
to have been saying that the requisite taxing purpose was lacking
because it was impossible for the government to gain any tax
revenue.8 0
These cases are not closely on point with the taxing statutes
considered here that do not involve the taxation of a criminal
activity, but rather the prohibition of a perfectly lawful activity.
It is at least possible to conclude, however, that a taxing measure
must be capable of producing revenue to be sustained, particu-
larly when it deals with regulation otherwise left to the state
regulatory bodies.
It is doubtful whether normalization produces any additional
taxable revenue at all, and meets the test of having a revenue
purpose. Arguably, sections 167(l) and 46(f) produce revenue in
that if a commission fails to order normalization the tax benefit
is denied. It has been demonstrated, however, that by taking into
account the rate base effects and the present worth of the tax
payments to be generated over a period of time, normalization
generates increased tax revenue only in high constant growth
situations. Otherwise, it will generate less tax revenue than flow-
through treatment."' Moreover, if there is a tax loss, it is actually
the accelerated depreciation and investment tax credit that de-
prive the government of revenue. Normalization merely insures
that the utility companies receive the monies that the Treasury
has foregone. 82
280. Id. at 100. Moreover, Justice Douglas found it irrelevant that a flat ban on heroin
sales might have been sustainable under the commerce clause since Congress had clearly
enacted a taxing measure. Id. at 101. The majority rather cryptically indicated that the
commerce clause would sustain the act and that the fact that the revenue obtained was
"negligible" was of little importance; however, this must be regarded as dictum. Id. at 98
n.13.
281. Pollock, The Effect of Alternative Regulatory Treatment of Tax Depreciation on
Utility Tax Payments, 26 NAT. TAX J. 43 (1973).
282. The "double loss" theory is discussed and shown to be imaginary. See notes 66-
69 and accompanying text supra. But see Accelerated Depreciation and State Ratemaking
Policy: The Case of California, 31 STA. L.R. 265, 267 and 297 (1979), concluding that §
167(e) is valid based on a "logical if debatable relationship to congressional concerns for
limiting revenue losses associated with accelerated depreciation."
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Even if some revenue purpose can be found, however, the
rationale of an older line of cases prohibiting regulation under the
taxing power seems more appropriate. In those cases, it was held
that Congress could not constitutionally interfere with legitimate
activities carried on by the citizens of the states by enacting a
penalty tax on activities left to state regulation.2m In many of
these instances later regulation of the activities in question un-
dertaken by Congress under the commerce power was sus-
tained. 24 These later decisions were in part attributable to a
broader interpretation of the commerce power itself. But, if the
older cases stand for anything, they indicate that Congress may
not, by an exercise of the taxing power having only a partial
regulatory effect, interfere in areas left to legitimate regulation by
the states. If there is a doubt as to the validity of federal tax
measures which support the state regulation285 or which do not
contradict any state law, the doubt should be even stronger when
the legislation undermines the state law. In this instance, the tax
does not fall on an activity such as selling heroin or engaging in
illegal gambling, and a taxpayer may not easily avoid the tax by
foregoing the prohibited activity.
The Supreme Court decisions with regard to the taxing
power do not take us very far. Because of the earlier cases limiting
the use of the taxing power, Congress has generally expanded the
role of the national government in the federal system by legisla-
tion enacted under the commerce power and the Civil War
Amendments. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in United States
v. Butler"' suggested that the power of Congress under Article 1,
283. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935) (tax on sales of liquor forbid-
den by state or local law); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922) (tax on grain sold by contract
for future delivery except that sold on boards of trade as defined by act); Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (excise tax on employer of child labor).
284. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (penalty for marketing agricultural
production in excess of quota); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (minimum
wage and hour legislation including child labor standards sustained as to workers who
produce goods for interstate commerce); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939) (penalizing
sale of agricultural products by warehousemen in excess of quota); Chicago Bd. of Trade
v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923) .(regulation of boards of trade handling transaction in grain
futures).
285. See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
286. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 6 (1936). The power to buy and appropriate
taxes for the general walfare has been referred to as the "spending power." G. GUNTHER
& N. DOWLING, CONsTrrruToNAL LAW, CASES & MATERIALS 366 passim (8th ed. 1970). This
title tends unduly to broaden the concept relating to the power by suggesting a limitation
on the power of Congress to spend the tax monies, which limitation, of course, does not
1979]
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Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution "to lay and collect Taxes
• . .for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States" might in some senses be broader than the commerce
clause power, since the power to expend public monies for the
general welfare was not interpreted as being limited by the direct
grants of legislative power under the other clauses of Section 8.
The Butler case itself, however, limited the use of this power
by holding invalid a tax on agricultural processors, the proceeds
of which were to be used to pay farmers to reduce production,
because such a plan to regulate local agricultural production in-
vaded an area of regulation left to the states.27 Although the
Butler case can be criticized for the conclusion that the regulation
of agricultural production was beyond federal control and re-
served to the states, even the dissent recognized that the power
to collect taxes for the general welfare could not be used to coerce
action truly left to state control.288 The difficulty is that neither
Butler nor any subsequent case gives much useful guidance in the
area between federal legislation that merely regulates individual
conduct and that which interferes with matters more specifically
left to state regulation.
The leading case is Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 19 in
which the Court sustained a federal excise tax on employment,
ninety percent of which was credited back to the employers in
states which adopted an unemployment compensation plan
meeting certain standards set up by Congress. This case is distin-
guishable on several grounds. First, the social security scheme
started with a tax and rewarded certain conduct by giving a
credit. With regard to required normalization, Congress first gave
the benefit and later took it away if the state regulators did not
allow normalization. This might not be considered significant as
an abstract matter, but the Court in Steward Machine Co. distin-
guished those cases in which "a tax dependent upon the conduct
of the taxpayers, or the state in which they live, where the con-
duct to be stimulated or discouraged is unrelated to the fiscal
need subserved by the tax in its normal operation . ... "I
exist. It might be more appropriate to refer to this power as the "general welfare" power
because vague as this language may be it does connote some limitation and definition.
287. 297 U.S. at 68. As with the other taxing power cases, Congress eventually
achieved a very similar regulation result that was upheld by the Court under the com-
merce power. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939).
288. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1936).
289. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
290. Id. at 591.
[Vol. 30
74
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol30/iss4/2
NORMALIZED TAXES
When Congress has elected to give a tax benefit and then
takes it back selectively, it is more difficult to find a relationship
to any perceived fiscal need. With the normalization statutes
there is not sufficient relationship between the tax conditioned
activity and the "fiscal need subserved by the tax." Although tax
collections under taxing statutes, as in Steward Machine Co., go
into the general treasury, the Court in Steward was careful to
note the existence of a valid federal purpose-relief of unemploy-
ment-the cost of which would fall on the federal government if
the states did not take on the burden. 29' Moreover, the tax credit
in that case allowed the states to impose the cost of unemploy-
ment relief on the same employers who were relieved of the obli-
gation to pay the federal tax.
The Court in Steward Machine Co. discussed at some length
the national purpose of the Act. 2 2 Finding a legitimate national
purpose to provide relief against unemployment, the Court then
had to decide if there was any obstacle to the accomplishment of
that purpose by encouraging the states to address it, rather than
simply spending the federal dollars directly, which would in no
way have infringed on the powers reserved to the states.
By comparison, it is difficult to find any valid federal pur-
pose at all for the normalization statutes. Assuming that Con-
gress can validly attempt to stimulate the economy by an overall
grant to business firms in the form of tax reductions to match new
equipment expenditures, that purpose must fail when applied to
regulated monopoly corporations guaranteed a fair return on their
investment. Even before the enactment of IRC sections 167(l)
and 46(f), the tax benefits given the utilities did not achieve their
alleged purpose of stimulating the economy. They resulted in
either a reduction in rates, achieved by regulatory flow-through,
or a windfall source of cash to utility shareholders, achieved by
normalization, but did not legitimately affect the utility compa-
nies' decisions to build more plants.293
If, for purposes of argument, the existence of a valid federal
purpose is conceded, there is still no indication that Congress
intended to use the taxes to relieve those utilities that are re-
quired to use flow-through ratemaking and thus lose the tax bene-
fit. In Steward Machine Co., there was a real choice between
291. Id. at 590-91.
292. Id. at 596-99.
293. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
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relief of the problem by use of the federal tax revenue or adoption
of a state plan using the money which would otherwise go to pay
federal taxes. In this instance there is no such option.
Although normalization may relieve Congress of the need to
subsidize the utility companies in more direct ways, there is no
evidence that Congress would do this if the states elected flow-
through; to date it has not. Moreover, if a state insists on flow-
through, it does not take on any financial or legal obligation to
furnish such assistance, so that Congress has not as in Steward
Machine Co. relieved the federal taxpayer of a burden.
Additionally, Steward Machine Co. stressed that the states
were left not only the choice of whether to adopt an unemploy-
ment compensation plan, but also were granted a reasonable de-
gree of freedom to exercise their own governmental judgment in
setting up such a plan. '94 The legislation considered in Steward
Machine Co., while it put financial pressure on the states to-take
on a legislative duty they were not meeting, left some choices to
the states and did not require them to violate any existing law.
The hidden utility company revenues obtained by normalization
force a state commission either to grant too high a return by
including the unreal taxes as a cost of service or to disguise the
activity by granting too low a regular rate of return to equalize
the unfair charge. The first alternative violates existing indepen-
dent statutory and constitutional protections by forcing ratepay-
ers to pay confiscatory charges295 and the second alternative
makes it impossible for a reviewing court to determine if these
standards have been applied.
298
Congress has here invaded the state regulatory scheme in an
area of regulation specifically left to the states by prior history
and decision.97 In doing so, it has given a tax benefit to those
294. 301 U.S. at 593-94.
295. See discussion in Part V.A. supra.
296. See note 259 and accompanying text supra.
297. The power of Congress to encroach upon state governmental activities as neces-
sary to carry out appropriate federal activities is broader. In Oklahoma v. United States
Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947), the Court upheld the extension of the Hatch
Act to state employees carrying out federal programs with federal monies. The forced
termination of such a state employee because of his political activities was approved on
the theory that Congress had the right to protect its programs by prohibiting persons
carrying out the federal contracts from participating in politics. This power may encroach
on the state's liberty to hire or elect who it pleases, but it does not interfere at all with
state regulatory decisions. It is not discussed in detail because the attachment of this kind
of condition to the use of federal money in a concededly valid federal program is not
analogous to the federal tax legislation in question.
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utilities that are allowed to charge illegal rates to their taxpayers
and denied it to those that are required to charge rates in the
usual and lawful manner. For this reason, it is an invalid exercise
of the taxing power. Any remaining doubt must be removed by
considering that the resulting rates are unconstitutional indepen-
dently because they violate due process and equal protection
duties as set forth in Part V.A.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to demonstrate that
certain ratemaking practices, included under the broad denomi-
nation of normalization, violate fundamental principles of rate-
making by allowing fictitious expenses to be charged to the cur-
rent ratepayers. This destroys the validity of the ratemaking for-
mula that has been in general use for almost a century. While it
may be possible to replace this formula, it certainly would not be
an easy task. Almost all public utility ratemaking law, whether
statutory, administrative or judicial, is predicated on its exist-
ence. The inclusion of fictitious costs cannot result in anything
but unreviewable ratemaking orders. Of course, the courts would
retain the power to reverse decisions, but any standard of ration-
ality would become impossible. There is very little to say on
behalf of normalization that could justify the imposition of such
chaos. There is nothing that normalization does which cannot be
done by direct and lawful means, such as the adjustment of the
rate of return. For this reason, the practice should be disapproved
and abandoned; legislation requiring it should be repealed as
unwise. If not so repealed, the legislation must eventually be
invalidated as requiring unjust and unreasonable rates and as
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